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Medicare Part D:
Prescription Drug Plan Copayment Structure and Premium Sensitivity
Rui Dai
ABTRACT
Since January 2006 Medicare beneficiaries have the option to purchase
prescription drug benefits from Medicare under the Part D program. The addition of
outpatient drugs to the Medicare programs reflects Congress’ recognition of the
fundamental change in recent years in how medical care is delivered in the U.S. It
recognizes the vital role of prescription drugs in the health care delivery system and the
need to modernize Medicare to assure their availability to Medicare beneficiaries. The
Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA)
created the Medicare drug benefit and specified a standard plan. The law also enables
plans to offer alternative benefit packages that are either actuarially equivalent or provide
enhanced benefits above the basic benefits. A majority of these alternative plans offer
multitiered formulary where different medications have different patient copayments.
Different from traditional Medicare, Part D benefits are provided by private sector
plans through a competitive bidding process. Firms submit a bid to the Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) which represents the expected cost to the firm
for providing basic benefits to an individual of average health. The competition between
plans was expected to drive premiums down toward marginal cost, ensuring that the
beneficiaries receive maximum benefits for a given public expenditure (Biles et al. 2004).
viii

This dissertation examines the stand-alone Medicare Prescription Drug Plans
(PDPs) bid and premium from the following perspectives using the 2006-2008 PDP data.
First, we examine the use of multiple-tier copayment structures. In particular, we tend to
discover the relationship between enrollee cost sharing at each tier and prescription drug
plan (PDP) bids. Bids are equivalent to the total premiums charged by an insurer. This
includes the premium paid by the consumer and the portion paid by the federal
government.
Further, we decompose plan bid and premium changes between 2006 and 2008
into two components, the proportion due to changes in plan characteristics and the
proportion due to changes in marginal price. By doing so, we estimate whether the
actuarial methods used to price those characteristics play a role in explaining the plan bid
and premium difference across years.
Finally, we measure the Medicare beneficiaries’ sensitivity to price in the PDP
market, specifically the elasticity and semi-elasticity of enrollment with respect to PDP
premium.
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Chapter One
Introduction

This chapter consists of two sections. Section 1.1 introduces the background of
the Medicare program, its current status and challenges faced. Section 1.2 discusses the
Medicare Part D program and some specific issues. .

1.1 Medicare
Medicare, the social insurance program in the United States, was signed into law
in 1965 by President Johnson as amendments to Social Security legislation. It provides
health insurance coverage to the people who are aged 65 or older, or people under 65
with permanent disabilities, ESRD (End Stage Renal Disease), or Lou Gehrig’s disease.

1.1.1 Eligibility
To be eligible for Medicare, people need to have made payroll tax contributions
for at least 10 or more years. Their spouses, if not working, are only eligible for Part A.

1.1.2 Administration and Financing
Medicare is administered by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS). As illustrated in Figure 1, it is partially financed by payroll taxes (41% in 2009)
imposed by the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and Self-Employment
Contributions Act of 1954. Other financing sources include general revenue (39% in
2009), beneficiary premiums (12% in 2009), interest, and others.
1

Figure 1 Medicare Revenue

Data Source: Kaiser Family Foundation, “Medicare at a Glance”, November 2008.
The original data is from 2008 Annual Report of the Boards of the Federal Hospital Insurance and
Federal Supplemental Medical Insurance Trust Funds.

1.1.3 Medicare Benefits:
Medicare benefits are categorized as Part A, Part B, Part C, and Part D as
illustrated in Figure 2. Part A (Hospital Insurance) and Part B (Medical Insurance) are
the two parts in the original Medicare program. Part A covers inpatient hospital, skilled
2

nursing care, home health (also under Part B) and hospice care. Part A accounts for 36%
of benefit spending in 2009 according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO
Medicare Baseline, March 2008).

Figure 2 Medicare Benefits

Notes: Doesn’t include administrative expenses such spending to administer the Medicare Drug
benefits and the Medicare Advantage program.
Data Source: Kaiser Family Foundation, “Medicare at a Glance”, November 2008.
The original data is from CBO Medicare Baseline, March 2008.
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Part B coverage includes services and products not covered by Part A, generally
on an outpatient basis, such as physician and nursing services, x-rays, laboratory and
diagnostic tests, durable medical equipment, etc. Part B accounts for 29% of benefit
spending in 2009 (CBO). Part B coverage is optional and is allowed to be deferred if the
Medicare beneficiary or their spouse is still actively working.
Part C refers to the “Medicare + Choice” program, which was passed by Balanced
Budget Act of 1997. This program allows the Medicare beneficiaries to receive their
Medicare benefits through private health insurance plans, instead of through the original
Medicare program. The “Medicare + Choice” program was renamed as “Medicare
Advantage” since the inception of the Medicare Part D program in 2006, but is still
referred to as Part C. Most Medicare Advantage (MA) plans offer coverage that meet or
exceed the standards set by the original Medicare program. Due to the flexibility of
benefits they offer, Medicare Advantage plans have gained popularity since their
inception. Medicare Advantage plans that offer prescription drug coverage are called
Medicare Advantage Prescription Drug plan (MAPD). In recent years, Congress has
increased payments to Medicare private plans to encourage plan participation throughout
the country. As a result, the average Medicare payment to Medicare Advantage plans is
113% of the cost of similar benefits in the original fee-for-service (FFS) program
(MedPAC, 2008). Now, Part C accounts for 24% of benefit spending.
Medicare Part D program started in January 1, 2006, providing the prescription
drug coverage. Currently, more than 25 million beneficiaries are enrolled in Medicare
Part D plans and Part D accounts for 11% of Medicare benefit spending in 2009 (CBO).
Detailed discussion on Medicare Part D is presented in section 1.2.
4

1.1.4 Medicare Supplemental Coverage
Medicare has a high member cost-sharing requirement, no limit on the out-ofpocket spending and coverage gap in the Part D benefits. Therefore, most Medicare
beneficiaries have some other forms of supplemental insurance, such as employersponsored retiree health plans, Medicaid and Medigap (supplemental private insurance
for medical expenses that are not covered or partially covered by Medicare). Only 11%
of Medicare beneficiaries had no supplemental coverage in 2006.

1.1.5 Reimbursement Method and Risk Scores
The 1997 Balanced Budget Act modified the Medicare Managed Care plans and
pays private plans participating in the Medicare + Choice market a monthly capitated rate
to provide health care services to enrolled Medicare beneficiaries (Pope et al. 2004).
Historically the capitation payments were linked to the FFS expenditures and set at 95%
of an enrollee’s county’s adjusted average per capita cost (AAPCC). The AAPCC rates
were defined by age, sex, Medicaid enrollment status, institutional status, and working
age status. Separate county factors were calculated for the aged and non-aged disabled,
and at the state level only for ESRD entitled beneficiaries.
The AAPCC rates only account for 1% of the variation in Medicare beneficiaries’
expenditures and do not pay more for sicker people. Thus it caused the Managed Care
Organizations to select healthier members and as a result, the overall Medicare program
expenditure increased. The Medicare + Choice program fundamentally changed the
Medicare managed care capitation method in 2000 and implemented the Medicare risk
adjustment CMS HCC (Hierarchical Condition Categories) model in 2004. During the
5

transitional period, the PIP-DCG (Principal Inpatient Diagnostic Cost Grouping) model
was used as a health based payment adjuster (Pope et al. 2004).
The HCC diagnostic classification system first classifies each of over 15,000
ICD-9-CM (international statistical classification of diseases and related health problems)
codes into 804 diagnostic groups, or DxGroups, which are further, aggregated into 189
Condition Categories, or CCs. CCs describe a broader set of similar diseases.
Hierarchies are imposed among similar CCs. Some non-significant HCCs were excluded
and only 70 HCCs were included in the final CMS HCC model.
The CMS HCC model also relies on demographic factors, Medicaid status,
originally disabled status, and institutional status. These factors and the 70 HCCs are
assigned coefficients which are estimated from clinical data. Individual Medicare
beneficiary’s Medical risk scores are calculated based his or her age, gender, Medicaid
status, originally disabled or not, institutional status and HCCs. The coefficients are
updated annually to account for changes. The nationwide overall risk scores are
normalized at 1.0. A higher risk score indicates a worse health status while a lower risk
score means a better health status.
The capitation payments using the CMS HCC model are proportional to the
Medicare beneficiaries risk scores. Managed Care Organizations enrolling healthier
members with lower risks scores receive less payment from CMS. On the other hand,
they are compensated for enrolling sicker members. Thus, favorable selection or cherrypicking problem in the traditional managed care industry is alleviated.

6

1.1.6 Medicare Advantage Bidding Process
Starting from 2006, a competitive bidding process has replaced the Adjusted
Community Rate Proposal filings required in 2005 and prior years (The Actuary
Magazine, Oct, 2005). The insurance companies that want to participate in the Medicare
Advantage market are required to submit their bids to CMS by the end of the first
Monday of June prior to the contract year on a plan base. Each bid is associated with a
unique contract ID and plan ID. Most insurance companies offer one contract but
multiple plans each year. Some big insurance companies may offer multiple contracts.
For Part A and B benefits, Medicare Advantage plans bid on traditional Medicare
benefits including traditional Medicare cost sharing levels. Lower cost sharing levels and
Medicare non-covered benefits are optional. The projected claim costs for each line of
the benefits, projected administration costs, and profits based on the projected enrollment
are inputs required in the CMS bid forms. MMA declared plan bids would be based on a
national profile population. In other words, each plan’s bid is normalized at risk score of
1.0.
For Part D, a separate bid form has to be submitted. The Part D competitive bids
are based on a national profile population as well. If a plan bid is higher than the national
average bid, its member premium for Part D is increased by the difference. Similarly, if a
plan bid is lower than the national average bid, it will have a lower Part D member
premium.
The payments each plan receives from CMS are directly determined by the bids
and adjusted by the risk scores. For sicker members who incur more claims, the plan will
receive more payment from CMS. Similarly, for healthier members, the plan receives
7

less payment from CMS. This process alleviates the anti-selection problem that the
Managed Care Organizations tend to enroll healthier members.
The competitive bidding process gives the plans little incentive to under or over
bid because they are only compensated up to the benchmark payment set by CMS. If a
plan bid is lower than the benchmark, they will receive 75% of the difference between the
benchmark and the plan bid as a rebate in addition to its bid amount. On the other hand,
if a plan bid is higher than the benchmark, the amount above the benchmark will be
passed to its members in terms of a higher member premium.

1.1.7 Current Status and Challenges
In 2007, Medicare provided health care coverage for 43 million Americans and
currently covers 45 million Americans. Enrollment is expected to reach 77 million by
2031 when the baby boom generation is fully enrolled.
Medicare benefit outlays are expected to total $477 billion in 2009, accounting for
13% of the federal budget and 22% of personal health care expenditure (CBO). It is
projected to reach $871 billion in 2018 according to CBO. Two main factors influencing
the annual growth of Medicare spending are the increasing volume of services and rising
prices. CBO estimates that a larger share of future growth in Medicare spending as a
share of the Gross Domestic Product will result from growth in health care cost rather
than from growth in enrollment. Efforts to control rising health costs would help mitigate
Medicare’s future funding shortfall (Kaiser, Medicare Nov 2008).
The greatest challenge for Medicare is the financing. According to the Medicare
Trustees, Part A Trust Fund is projected to be depleted in 2019, with insufficient funds to
8

pay benefits (Kaiser, Medicare Nov 2008). Figure 3 shows the financial burden of health
spending among Medicare beneficiaries from 1997 to 2005. While the spending is
increasing, the speed has slowed down in recent years.

Figure 3 Medicare Spending

Data Source: Kaiser Family Foundation, “Medicare at a Glance”, November 2008.
The original data is from Kaiser/UCLA analysis of Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey Cost
and Use files, 1997-2005.

Other critical issues that Medicare faces include the management of care for
chronically ill high-cost beneficiaries, fairness of payments to providers and plans, aging
population, etc. For reference, Appendix B1 shows the characteristics of the Medicare
population.
9

1.2 Medicare Part D
Medicare Part D refers to the Medicare Prescription Drug Program, which was
established by section 101 of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003 and went into effect in January 2006. The new Part D
benefits constitute perhaps the most significant change to the Medicare program since its
inception in 1965.
The prescription drug benefit is not part of the original Medicare program. The
addition of outpatient drugs to the Medicare programs reflects Congress’ recognition of
the fundamental change in recent years in how medical care is delivered in the U.S. It
recognizes the vital role of prescription drugs in the health care delivery system and the
need to modernize Medicare to assure their availability to Medicare beneficiaries.
Effective January 1, 2006, the Part D program established an optional prescription drug
benefit for individuals who are entitled to Medicare Part A and/or enrolled in Part B.

1.2.1 Eligibility and Enrollment Process
Individuals who are entitled to Medicare Part A (whether actually enrolled or not)
or currently enrolled in Part B are eligible for Medicare Part D benefits. Enrollment in
Part D is voluntary except for individuals who are dual eligibles (those also in Medicaid).
Individuals who are first eligible for Medicare are required to enroll three months before
or three months after they turn 65. If they fail to enroll in that 6-month period, they have
to pay a penalty in the form of a higher premium. Individuals who are already in
Medicare can enroll in a Part D plan during the open enrollment period which starts on
November 15 and lasts until the end of December of the year. During this period, they
10

can choose to enroll or switch plans. After this period, they must affirmatively stay
enrolled in a Part D plan.
CMS will auto-enroll or facilitate enrollment for Medicare beneficiaries who are
eligible for Low-income subsidy (LIS). Dual eligible LIS beneficiaries who stay in
traditional FFS Medicare or enrolled in an MA only plan are randomly enrolled into one
of benchmark PDPs. Dual eligibles enrolled in a MA only plan can also be auto assigned
to a MAPD benchmark plan. The benchmark plans are those that offer defined standard
benefits with a premium below the benchmark in each region set by CMS. Facilitated
enrollment is the process for other LIS eligibles. The process is essentially the same as
auto-enrollment, but the timing of the first round assignments differs. Furthermore, all
LIS beneficiaries can switch plans anytime during the contract year whereas other
beneficiaries can only switch plans during the annual open enrollment period.

1.2.2 MAPD vs. PDP
Different from traditional Medicare, Medicare Part D is provided through private
companies or entities approved by CMS. Beneficiaries can obtain drug benefits through
two types of private plans, the stand-alone PDPs or MAPDs which cover both medical
service and prescription drugs. Individuals enrolled in PDPs receive their medical
benefits from traditional FFS Medicare or MA only plans. Different from the MAPDs,
which are offered at the county level, the PDPs operates at the PDP region level. Defined
by CMS, there are 34 PDP regions in the United States, each of which cover one or more
states (see Appendix A, Table A2).

11

1.2.3 Part D Standard Benefits
The MMA established a standard Medicare Part D benefit package which is
defined in terms of benefit structure, not in terms of the drugs that must be covered. As
illustrated in Figure 4, in 2007,the standard benefits are $265 annual deductible, 25%
coinsurance, $2,400 initial coverage limit (ICL), $3,850 member out of pocket threshold
(OOP max). After meeting the $265 annual deductible, the beneficiary pays 25% of the
cost of a covered Part D prescription drug up to an ICL of $2,400. Once the ICL is
reached, the beneficiary is liable for the full drug cost, which is called the coverage gap
or more commonly known as the “donut-hole”.

Figure 4 Part D Standard Plan

Data Source: CMS.
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When the beneficiary’s total out-of-pocket cost (including the deductible,
copayments, and spending in the coverage gap, but not the monthly premium) for the
year reaches $3,850, he or she reaches the catastrophic coverage, in which he or she pays
$2.15 for a generic or preferred drug and $5.35 for other drugs, or 5% coinsurance,
whichever is greater. Federal government pays 80% of the drug cost with the remaining
15% paid by the private insurance plans.
The deductible, ICL, OOP max and catastrophic copayments are updated every
year to account for the inflation and increasing drug costs. Table 1 shows the standard
benefits from 2006 to 2009.

Table 1 Medicare Part D Defined Standard Benefits
Part D Standard Benefit Design
Deductible
Coinsurance (all tiers)
Initial Coverage Limit
Out-of-Pocket Threshold

2006
$250
25%
$2,250
$3,600

2007
$265
25%
$2,400
$3,850

2008
$275
25%
$2,510
$4,050

2009
$295
25%
$2,700
$4,350

1.2.4 Part D Alternative Benefits
The defined standard benefits are not the most common benefits offered by Part D
plans. Only 10 percent of plans offer the defined standard benefits. Many plans have
used the flexibility allowed by MMA to vary their benefit designs. A majority of plans
eliminated at least part of the standard deductible, substituted flat copayments for
coinsurance, and adopted tiered cost-sharing where beneficiaries pay different amounts
for different types of drugs. The most common approach was to use three or four tiers
13

with different copayment amounts for generic drugs, preferred brand-name drugs, nonpreferred brand-name drugs and sometimes specialty drugs (e.g. biotechnology products
or injectable drugs) (Hoadley, 2006; Duggan, Healy, and Morton, 2008).
These alternative plans are categorized as actuarial equivalent, basic alternative,
or enhanced alternative depending on benefit structure. Actuarial equivalent plans and
basic alternative plans are actuarially equivalent to the defined standard plans. The
difference lies in how the benefit structure is adjusted. Actuarial equivalent plans can
only adjust the coinsurance and are not allowed to change the standard deductible. On
the other hand, basic alternative plans can adjust both the deductible and coinsurance.
Enhanced alternative plans offer richer benefits than defined standard plans, such as
lower deductibles and copayments, and partial or full gap coverage.
For approval, these alternative bids need to pass certain tests specified by CMS.
These tests include
Test 1: The total coverage is equal to or greater than that of the defined standard
benefit.
Test 2: The unsubsidized value is equal to or greater than that of the defined
standard benefit.
Test 3: The average cost at the ICL is equal to or greater than that of the defined
standard benefit.
Test 4: Deductible is equal to or less than that of the defined standard benefit.
Test 5: Average catastrophic cost sharing is equal to or less than that of the
defined standard benefit.

14

Actuarial equivalent bids only need to pass test 3 and test 5, while basic and
enhanced alternative plans are required to pass all five tests.

1.2.5 Plan Formularies
One reason for an insurer to offer an alternative plan is to incorporate utilization
controls, such as multi-tiered formularies, into benefit structure. Formulary is a list of
drugs covered by the plans. Different from the benefits, there is no such a “standard
formulary” although CMS releases a list of Part D covered drugs. Plans are not required
to pay for all Part D covered drugs. Instead, plans can establish their own formularies as
long as the formulary and benefit structure are not found by CMS to discourage
enrollment by certain Medicare beneficiaries. In addition, plans can change drugs on
their formulary during the course of the year with a 60-day notice to affected parties.
Generally, each plan’s formulary is organized into tiers, and each tier is associated
with a set of copayment amounts. Lower tiers are associated with lower copayments.
Most plans offered four-tier formularies. Tier 1 is generic drugs, tier 2 is preferred brand
drugs, tier 3 is non-preferred brand drugs, and tier 4 is specialty and injectable drugs.
Some plans may offer 5 tiers by breaking generic drugs into preferred generics and nonpreferred generics, while some plans may offer 3 tiers by combining preferred brand and
non-preferred brand drugs.
The primary difference between the formularies of different Part D plans lies in
the coverage of brand name drugs. Plans can also offer Part D excluded drugs as
supplement benefits. However, plans offering excluded drugs are not allowed to pass on
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those costs to Medicare, and are required to repay CMS if they are found to have billed
Medicare on these cases.
Utilization control tools, such as prior authorization, quantity limit and step
therapy, are used to help manage drug use and total costs (Hoadley, 2006). The
application of such tools can be an important way for plans to steer beneficiaries to
specific drugs as well as to control the use of certain drugs. Yet enrollees may not know
whether these tools might create a real barrier to getting their medication until they first
attempt to fill a prescription for a specific drug under their plans.

1.2.6 Part D Bidding Process and Beneficiary Premium
Similar to Medicare Part C, Medicare Part D premiums and subsidies are
determined through a competitive bidding process. Firms submit separate Part D bids to
CMS on a plan-by-plan base. These bids represent the expected cost to the firm for
providing the basic benefits (defined standard benefits) to an individual of average health
(individuals with a risk score equal to 1.0). In addition to the bid amount, the projected
low income subsidy and federal reinsurance for catastrophic claims are required to be
filled in the bid form.
Different from Part C, Part D member premium is also affected by the national
average bid amount and national average federal reinsurance. Each year, CMS calculates
the national average monthly bid amount and federal reinsurance amount. In 2006, the
national average bid and federal reinsurance were calculated on an equal weighting base.
In other words, all plans are given equal weights no matter how many members they
enroll. Enrollment weighting replaced the equal weights in contract year 2009. In the
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transitional years 2007 and 2008, the national average bid amount was a composite of the
two approaches. For example, in 2008, 40% of the national average bid amount was
based on the uniform weighted average and 60% was based on the enrollment weighted
average (CMS, Apr, 2007).

Figure 5 National Average Bid and Member Premium

Data Source: Medpac, “Part D Payment System” (October, 2008)

Once the national average bid amount is determined, the national average member
premium is calculated as 25.5% of the sum of national average bid and national average
federal reinsurance. However, plans may bid higher or lower than the national average
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bid, the difference becomes (or reduces) the member’s liability. The members must pay
the national average premium plus (or minus) any difference between the plan’s bid and
the national average bid.
Figure 5 illustrates how the national average bid and member premium are
calculated and how each plan’s member premium is determined. In this example,
members who choose plan 2 which is equal to the national average bid pay the national
average member premium. Members who choose plan with a higher bid have to pay a
higher premium than the national average premium. On the other hand, members who
choose plan 1 with lower bid pay lower premiums.

1.2.7 Part D Reimbursement Method and Risk Scores
Using an approach similar to the medical CMS HCC model, the part D capitation
payments are calculated using the CMS RxHCC (prescription drug) model. Different
from the medical CMS HCC model, CMS RxHCC model uses the low-income status
instead of Medicaid status. The low income beneficiaries include not only Medicaid
beneficiaries, but also Medicare beneficiaries whose family income is below the 150% of
the poverty line. In addition, the RxHCC model used different ICD-9-CM codes and
aggregated them into RxHCCs.
Similar to the medical CMS HCC model, a Medicare beneficiary’s Part D risk
score is determined by his or her age, gender, low-income status, institutional status,
disabled status, and RxHCCs in the CMS RxHCC model. A higher risk score indicates a
poorer health status. In addition, the coefficients of the above factors in the RxHCC
model are updated annually.
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Figure 6 Part D Reimbursement Method

Data Source: Medpac, “Part D Payment System” (October, 2008)

As illustrated in Figure 6, the plan capitation payments is risk-adjusted.
Specifically, the capitation payments are proportional to the Part D risk scores produced
by the CMS RxHCC model. Plans are paid more for enrolling sicker members (with
higher risk scores) while they are paid less if they enroll healthier members (with lower
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risk scores). The plans are also compensated by enrolling high risk members in terms of
federal reinsurance subsidy and low income members in terms of low income subsidy.
The Part D risks scores are not comparable to the medical risk scores since the
CMS HCC model and RxHCC model are built based on different diagnostic codes. In
other words, it is not necessary that Medicare beneficiaries with higher medical risk
scores have higher Part D risk scores. Therefore, the capitation payments for medical
service and for Part D coverage are independent of each other.

1.2.8 Government Subsidy
For each Medicare beneficiary enrolled in a MAPD or a PDP plan, Medicare
provides plans with a subsidy that averages 74.5 percent of standard coverage for all
types of beneficiaries (MedPac, Sep 2006). Or, with the exception of low income
subsidy plans, the consumer premium is 25.5% of the sum of the bid and federal
reinsurance on average. The subsidy takes two forms: direct subsidy and federal
reinsurance subsidy.
Direct subsidy - a capitated payment to plans calculated as a share of the adjusted
national average of plan bids. The direct subsidy is calculated as the difference between
the risk-adjusted bid and the fixed member basic premium.
Federal reinsurance – Medicare subsidizes 80 percent of drug spending above an
enrollee’s catastrophic threshold. Reinsurance acts as a form of risk adjustment by
providing greater federal subsidies for higher cost enrollees.
In addition, Medicare establishes symmetric risk corridors separately for each
plan to limit the plan’s overall losses or profits. Under risk corridors, Medicare limits a
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plan’s potential losses (or gains) by financing some of the higher-than-expected costs (or
recouping excessive profits). These corridors are scheduled to widen, meaning that plans
should bear more insurance risk over time. (MedPac, Sep 2006)
Since 2006, Medicare Part D replaced Medicaid as the primary source of
prescription drug coverage for individuals who are dually eligible for Medicare and
Medicaid. Special consideration has been given to the low-income beneficiaries in terms
of providing them very rich benefits. Specifically, qualifying low-income beneficiaries
are eligible for the special need plans that have no premiums, deductibles, or coverage
gaps and limited cost sharing ($1 to $5 per prescription). The low income member cost
sharing by year is provided in Appendix B, Figure B3 and Figure B4. Plans enrolling
LIS members receive additional subsidies from the federal government to cover the
beneficiary’s premium and additional benefits.

1.2.9 Current Status
In 2006, about 65 organizations chose to participate in the Medicare Part D
market offering 1,314 MAPD plans and 1,429 PDPs. In 2007 and 2008, the number of
organizations and plans increased moderately. In 2009, a total of 1,689 PDPs are offered
nationwide, down from 1,824 PDPs in 2008. These PDPs are provided by PDP region.
In other words, a PDP is required to be open to all Medicare beneficiaries in the PDP
region that it chooses to enter. In each of the 34 PDP regions defined by CMS, a total of
40-60 PDPs are available to the beneficiaries. In 2009, the number of PDPs per region
ranges from a low of 45 PDPs in Alaska region to a high of 57 PDPs in the
Pennsylvania/West Virginia region. These numbers are down slightly from a range of 47
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PDPs (Alaska region) to 63 PDPs (Pennsylvania/West Virginia region) in 2008 (Kaiser,
Nov, 2008).
The average monthly PDP premium in 2009 (unweighted by enrollment) is
$45.45. This is a 14% increase from the unweighted average monthly premium of $41.02
in 2008, up from $37.43 in 2006. PDP premiums will vary widely by region, ranging
from a low of $10.30 per month for a PDP in New Mexico to a high of $136.80 per
month for a PDP in New York. (Kaiser, Nov, 2008). This premium variation by region
may reflect heath difference beyond those captured by risk adjusters, variations in the
prescribing practices of physicians, and the extent of expected competition from
Medicare Advantage plans.
The market share of each organization is relatively stable, for instance, nine out of
the top ten organizations with the highest enrollment in 2006 were also among the top ten
organizations by enrollment in 2007. No significant change was found in the market
share in 2008. United Health Group, Humana and Universal American Financial
Corporation remain the top three in terms of total enrollment from 2006 to 2008.
In August 2008, CMS estimated that the 10-year cost of the Part D program
would be $395 billion, down from the original estimated $634 billion. One factor
contributing to the lower cost is the increased use of generic drugs. This trend is
expected to continue as many brand drugs lost their patents recently.
As of November 2008, 17.5 million Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in PDPs and
8.6 million Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in MAPDs. The PDP penetration rate is 39%
and the MAPD penetration is 19%. Of these 26 million members, 9.4 million are
enrolled as low income members including 6.2 million as full-benefit dual eligibles.
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Other Medicare beneficiaries have other sources of creditable coverage, such as employer
group health plans, Veterans Administration, etc. However, based on Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) estimates, approximately 10% of the Medicare
beneficiaries lacked creditable drug coverage in 2007 (Kaiser, Nov, 2008).

1.2.10 Challenges
The main challenges for the federal government are budgeting and financing.
CMS, as the administrator of Medicare, has to deal with many issues, such as monitoring
PDP and MAPD plan enrollment, market stability, cost sharing and formulary, lowincome subsidy participation, and the impact of Part D on total drug expenditures and on
out-of-pocket spending by Medicare beneficiaries.
The insurance companies face new challenges in addition to the risks in the
regular insurance market. The MAPD plans and PDPs that choose to enter the Medicare
Part D market have to determine what premiums to charge, whether to offer alternative
benefits, and/or special need plans, and how to structure copayments and the formulary
files in order to survive and succeed in the market. Similar to the commercial insurance
market, adverse selection and moral hazard may exist in the Medicare Part D market.
Adverse selection arises if only those most likely to have claims enroll in the plans while
those least likely do not. Thus, part D could fail to meet financial targets if healthy fails
to enroll. Adverse selection could also arise from consumer shopping across plans to find
formularies that include drugs they need; this can cause plans with broad formularies to
selectively attract consumers with expensive drug needs, making them unprofitable. The

23

plans also have to face potential moral hazard, in which the Part D coverage encourages
doctors and patients to opt for more medications, and be less selective in keeping down
drug costs and insurers respond by making the approval process for branded drugs
burdensome (Winter, 2006).
In order to overcome the hurdles of the adverse selection and moral hazard,
private insurance plan may choose use the utilization control tools such as prior
authorization (.i.e., plan approval of a particular drug before the prescription can be
filled), step therapy (i.e., requirement that a less expensive drug be used before the
originally prescribed drug can be obtained), or quantity limits (i.e., restrictions on how
many pills can be obtained at one time) (Hoadley, 2006). Early evidence has suggested
that some plans are flagging a substantial number of drugs with these restrictions, while
other plans use them far more sparingly, (Hoadley, 2006). These utilization control tools
are expected to control the enrollees’ prescription drug utilization and hence lower the
plan’s claim costs.
Implementation of the Medicare Part D program brought new challenges not only
to the federal government and insurance companies, but also to Medicare beneficiaries.
In order to receive Part D benefits, beneficiaries need to actively enroll in either standalone PDPs or MA-PDs during the open enrollment period. Online enrollment is
available and encouraged. CMS provides convenient tools to help Medicare beneficiaries
to choose the plans that best meet their needs. For example, Medicare beneficiaries can
easily find the plans that cover their medications and compare the plan premiums on
CMS website. However, some Medicare beneficiaries fail to enroll in a Part D plan due
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to the lack of computer knowledge, access to computers or Part D information while
some others complain about the complicated Part D benefits and enrollment process.
Effectively educating Medicare beneficiaries is a critical issue for the successful
implementation of the Medicare Part D program.
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Chapter Two
Literature Review

This chapter consists of two sections. Section 1 provides an overview of existing
literatures related to the Medicare Part D program. Section 2 specifically reviews the
studies focusing on the impacts of insurance characteristics.

2.1 Medicare Part D Program
The Medicare Part D program received extensive attention from researchers and
policy makers even before its inception in 2006. Criticisms were heard frequently as
well. For example, the “donut-hole” made many, especially for those who need drug
benefits most, without drug coverage for much of the plan year. Past studies have
covered many different aspects of the Part D program, such as program costs,
implementation, impacts, benefits, enrollment, etc. To avoid an exhaustive list, we have
selected some representative studies, summarized as follows.
From the policy maker’s perspective, Hoadley (2006) discussed the government’s
challenges in implementing the new Medicare prescription benefits, such as overseeing
the enrollment, plan formularies and benefits. He mentioned that the program’s success
would be judged by whether beneficiaries enroll in plans that meet their needs and
whether the program’s costs are held within reasonable limits.
Researchers are more interested in the impacts that the new Medicare Part D
program has brought. Lucarelli (2006) found that the Medicare Part D program has a
positive effect on health status and life expectancy. Blum (2005) measured the impact of
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enrollment assumptions in the Medicare prescription drug benefit on premiums and
federal costs. In 2005, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in CMS projected that a
significant proportion of Medicare beneficiaries would enroll in the new Medicare Part D
program starting in 2006. Blum’s analysis showed that the average premiums and total
costs could be significantly higher than CBO projections if enrollment is significantly
concentrated among beneficiaries who have higher expected drug spending.
Medicare Part D’s specific benefits structures are also of interest, especially the
“donut-hole”. Stuart (2005) assessed the impact of coverage gaps (“donut-hole”) in the
Medicare Part D benefits. The author found that the discontinuities in drug benefits
resulted in sizable reductions in medication use and spending, which is magnified in
people with common chronic illness. Individuals with chronic illnesses that result in very
high medication use are particularly likely to reach the donut-hole. For example, Patel
and Davis (2006) found that the Medicare beneficiaries with ESRD face substantial total
expenditure and most of them will reach the “donut-hole”. Gold (2006) described the
premiums and cost-sharing characteristics of the Medicare Part D benefits offered by all
PDPs and MAPD plans in 2006. Hoadley (2006) compared the benefit design and
formularies offered by plans in 2006 and 2007. Hoadley (2006) also gave an in-depth
examination of formularies and other features of Medicare Part D plans and found
significant variation across plans with respect to formularies, cost-sharing and utilization
control tools.
As the consumer, Medicare beneficiaries have received much attention as well.
Winter et al. (2006) found that a majority of the Medicare beneficiaries had information
about the program and planned to enroll before the open enrollment began. They
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expected that enrollees would benefit from the program and showed concern that elderly
with poor health or cognitive impairment would make poor enrollment and plan choice
due to complexity of the competing plans. Heiss, McFadden and Winter (2006)
investigated why some Medicare beneficiaries failed to enroll in the Medicare Part D and
found that majorities of the senior are troubled by the deductible and gap provision and
the stability of the plan formularies.
Dual eligibles are not only given “extra help” from government, but also received
“extra attention” from researchers. Buchsbaum, Varon and Kagel (2007) gathered
information on the ongoing successes and challenges that dual eligibles faced. The dual
eligibles reported problems with formulary, utilization control, enrollment, spend-down
issues, communication with Part D plans and payment issues.
Simon and Lucarelli (2006) are the pioneer researchers who used the econometric
models to measure the impacts of the Medicare Part D program. Using the 2006 (the first
year of Medicare Part D program) PDP data, they tested how insurers set premiums in the
Part D market. Particularly, they found that (1) the number of insurers in a market is big
enough that it does not appear to affect the premium. (2) the full drug prices are listed
appear to be reflected to some degree in the premium charged. (3) weak relationship
between premiums and out-of-pocket payments for different set of drugs. (4) the
institutional setting and the regional market characteristics affect the firm’s bidding
behavior and the resulting premiums. However, while premiums are clearly important to
beneficiaries, given the substantial government subsidies, premiums may not reflect
insurers’ expected costs for offering a specific benefit package. The premium for a plan
reflects the enrollee share of the bid, the difference between the firm’s bid and the
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national average bid, plus the full value of any enhanced benefits. The proportion of
expected costs covered by the government subsidy can vary widely across plans.

2.2 Effects of Insurance and Plan Characteristics
This section specifically reviews the studies focusing on the impacts of insurance
characteristics (cost sharing and utilization control tools) on the demand and utilization of
medical services and prescription drugs, and the impact of plan characteristics on
premium setting.

2.2.1 Cost Sharing
Many researchers have studied the effects of insurance characteristics on the
demand and consumption of health services. For example, one focus of research has
been examining how cost sharing affects the use of services. Low cost sharing is often
linked to higher, potentially inefficient utilization, referred to as moral hazard. On the
other hand, higher cost sharing (deductible and coinsurance) reduces the demand for
medical service and hence the total health care expenditures (Manning, 1987). Such
findings exist for total healthcare use as well as for specific services such as preventive
services (Solanki, 2000).
Cost-sharing also affects prescription drug use. An increase in the prescription
copayment is associated with a drop in the number of prescriptions filled (Harris, 1990).
Such a reduction may enhance efficiency if the low cost sharing resulted in inefficient
utilization. However, such a reduction may have negative consequences if the original
utilization levels were not inefficient. Gibson, Ozminkowski, and Goetzel (2005) found
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that cost-sharing reduces the consumption of prescription drugs, and suggests that such
reductions have unintended effects on the process and outcomes of therapy. Such
unintended effects were found by Tamblyn (2001) with increased cost-sharing for
prescription drugs in elderly persons and welfare recipients leading to a reduction in drug
utilization and a higher rate of adverse events.
Many studies have shown that a tiered cost-sharing structure is an effective tool
for insurance companies to control costs. Huskamp et al. (2005) examined the change in
demand behavior after the introduction of a third tier for non-preferred brand drugs.
They found that adding a third tier induces a shift to lower tiered drugs and strengthens
the plan’s negotiating power over drug prices. The introduction of a third tier caused
individuals to shift from non-preferred brand medications to preferred brand name
medications, however, the effect of a tier 2 copayment increase has not been consistently
found to cause a shift towards generics (Gibson, Ozminkowski, and Goetzel, 2005).
Overall, Joyce et al. (2002) found that plans with more tiers have less total plan spending.
Motheral and Fairman (2001) showed that three-tier prescription copayments controls
drug costs without changing the use of other medical resources.
Gilman and Kautter (2007) focused on Medicare beneficiaries. They found that
higher tiered drug plans reduce overall expenditures and the number of prescriptions
purchased by Medicare beneficiaries. However, they also showed that beneficiaries are
less responsive (i.e., demand is less elastic) to cost sharing incentives when using drugs
that treat chronic conditions.
There are a few studies that measure the relationship between plan benefit
structure and premiums, but none of these are specific to drug plans. Jensen and
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Morrisey (1990) measured the relationship between group health insurance premiums and
policy characteristics including plan benefits, cost-sharing and out-of-pocket expense
limits. They found that the member cost-sharing, especially for hospital care,
significantly lowers fee-for-service premiums. Robst (2006) examined the Medigap
insurance premiums and estimated the marginal prices for Medigap benefits. His study
showed that the Medigap plans are generally priced in accordance with the actuarial
value of the benefits.
Some studies focused on the impact of tiered copayments on the enrollees’
demand behaviors. Overall, cost sharing has been found to reduce consumer demand.
Most insurance products in these studies were priced using experience rating and thus
reflect the expected costs of providing benefits to enrollees. Conversely, Part D plans
started using experience rating in 2008, and bids reflect the expected cost of providing
the standard benefits to a person of average health. Thus, a relationship between cost
sharing and plan bids may be less apparent.
There are at least two reasons to expect a relationship between cost sharing and
firm bids. First, plan bids vary from the national average bid, and also vary within each
region. Thus, firms have different expectations within a region. In part, expected costs
will differ based on the utilization management level of a firm. Given that Part D plans
are required to price their products using appropriate actuarial methods, plan bids are
expected to be lower for plans with lower expected costs that results from higher member
cost-sharing. In addition, utilization management allows insurers to better control costs
and reduce the degree of uncertainty. A reduction in uncertainty normally leads to a
reduction in the risk spread that an insurer builds into the bid. It is, however, difficult to
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predict how the effects will vary across tiers. For example, cost sharing may have a
greater effect on brand name medications than generics if individuals respond to a tier 2
cost share by switching to cheaper generics. However, research results have not
consistently shown that cost sharing induces a shift toward generics (Gibson,
Ozminkowski, and Goetzel, 2005).

2.2.2 Utilization Control Tools
Plans may also face moral hazard, in which the coverage encourages doctors and
patients to opt for more medical service, perhaps to the point where the marginal cost
exceeds the marginal benefit. In order to reduce moral hazard, plans may choose to use
cost management tools. These tools have been used widely by managed care
organizations to control the costs. The effects have been confirmed by researchers.
Feldstein, Wickizer and Wheeler (1988) showed that utilization review program by
private insurance companies effectively control the health service utilization and costs.
The most commonly used utilization control tools include prior authorization, step
therapy, and quantity limits (Hoadley, 2006). Some researchers have conducted the
clinical analysis to examine the impacts of these tools on the utilization of certain drugs.
For example, Goldfarb et al. (1999) showed that implementation of a monthly limit (four
tablets or injections) on sumatriptan (a treatment for migraines) decreased an HMO's
pharmacy costs. Smalley et al. (1995) found that the PA requirements may be highly cost
effective with regard to expenditures for drugs that have very similar efficacy and safety,
but substantial variation in costs. MacKinon and Kumar (2001) did a critical review of
the literature of prior authorization programs. They found that the overall effect of PA
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programs in controlling drug costs is efficient. Yokoyama et al. (2007) demonstrated that
a step-therapy intervention for ARBs that required prior use of an ACEI or an ARB was
associated with an approximately 13% lower drug cost per day compared with a health
plan with no step-therapy intervention. On the other hand, some researchers hold
different views. Panzer (2005) showed that implementing a generic step therapy
formulary for selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) in patients with anxiety
disorders may be associated with an increased amount of therapy change and early
treatment discontinuation, resulting in an overall cost increase to a health plan.
Since the inception of the Medicare Part D program, pharmacy utilization control
tools , including prior authorization, quantity limit and step therapy have been used by
insurance companies to manage drug utilization and total costs. According to Hoadley
(2006), plans varied significantly in the type of utilization control tools used to restrict
enrollees’ access to specific drugs, and in the frequency these tools were applied. In
addition, plans were more likely to apply quantity limits for covered drugs than to require
step therapy, which was applied slightly more often than prior authorization
requirements. He also mentioned that at least half of the plans used one or more
utilization control tools on five of the top 10 brand-name drugs. Conversely, quantity
limit restrictions were far less commonly used for the top 10 generic drugs.

2.2.3 Premium and Premium Elasticity
Insurance premium is one of the favorable research subjects as well. McLaughlin
(2002) showed that Medigap premiums vary considerably among geographic markets.
They also found a strong positive relationship between Medigap premiums and HMO
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participation. Atherly (2004) demonstrated that premiums have a significant effect on
plan selection in the Medicare program. As introduced in the previous sections, Jenson
and Morrisey (1990) measured group health insurance premiums and Robst (2006)
measured Medigap premium using hedonic pricing models. In 2007, Robst measured the
market structure, regulations and adverse selection as the determinants of Medigap
supplemental insurance premiums. Simon and Lucarelli (2006) have examined the
determinants of premiums in the Part D program. They found that premiums in 2006
were weakly related to beneficiary out-of-pocket costs, and reflected regional
characteristics to a greater degree.
The price sensitivity of Medicare beneficiaries is of interest to policy makers and
researchers. The question of whether Medicare beneficiaries are sensitive to price in the
PDP market pertains directly to the justification for private drug coverage under
Medicare (Frakt and Pizer, 2009). However, limited studies have been done to measure
Medicare beneficiaries’ premium elasticities. Town and Liu (2003) estimated the
monthly semi-elasticity to be -0.009 for a typical Medicare HMO using a mean utility
logit model, while the median plan elasticity is -0.33 conditional on charging a positive
premium. Frakt and Pizer (2009) estimated price elasticity in the PDP market using 2007
PDP enrollment data. The authors found a price elasticity of -1.45 with the elastic
demand indicating that PDP premiums are closer to marginal cost than Medicare HMO
premiums.
This dissertation reexamines price elasticity in the PDP market. There are at least
two reasons to revisit this question. First, in 2006 and 2007, plans submitted bids using
manual rating due to a lack of experience in the market. In other words, plans used
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market characteristics to generate bids, which limited variability in pricing for similar
products. In 2008, plans were required to use experience rating to price their products.
Experience rating generates greater variability in bids and premiums for similar products
than manual rating (Cutler, 1994). Such variation is expected to lead to greater price
sensitivity among Medicare PDP enrollees.
Second, Frakt and Pizer (2009) assumed that individuals not enrolled in the PDPs
purchased a composite “outside good”, whose characteristics are not included in the
utility function. However, individuals who are not enrolled in the PDPs are more likely
to enroll in MAPDs, rather than an unknown “outside good”. In this dissertation, we
define MAPD plans as the “outside good” and include MAPD premiums into the utility
function. Consistent with Town and Liu’s (2003) analysis of HMOs, the price is defined
as the difference in PDP and MAPD premiums.

2.3 Summary
Correctly pricing the Part D bid is critical for the successful implementation of the
Medicare Part D program. As we know, an overpriced plan requires enrollees pay higher
premiums and represent an inefficient use of the government subsidy. On the other hand,
an underpriced plan drives the plan out of business in the long run. According to CMS’s
guidance, all plan bids should be priced using actuarial assumptions. In other words,
correctly priced plan bids should be a function of the plan characteristics, such as the
annual deductible, member cost sharing, drugs on the formulary, etc. Medicare
beneficiaries are expected to enroll in plans that best meet their needs in terms of
premium and coverage. The question whether Medicare beneficiaries are sensitive to
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price in the PDP market pertains directly to the justification for private drug coverage
under Medicare (Frakt and Pizer, 2009).
After reviewing the existing literature, we found that little research has been done
to measure the relationship between Medicare Part D plan characteristics and the Part D
bids/premiums, and premium elasticity.
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Chapter Three
Research Design

This chapter consists of four sections. Section 3.1 outlines the objectives and
hypotheses to be carried out in this dissertation. Section 3.2 first presents the data
sources and information contained in each source, and then discuss briefly the
compilation of the data, including the data cleansing and merging processes. Section 3.3
discusses, in detail, the variables included in our model specifications. Section 3.4
presents our methodology applied and the econometric models derived.

3.1 Objectives and Hypotheses
This dissertation examines the stand-alone PDP bids and premiums from different
perspectives using 2006-2008 PDP data.
First, we consider how the plan characteristics affect the bids. Bids are equivalent
to the total premiums charged by an insurer. This includes the premium paid by the
consumer and the portion paid by the federal government. Specifically, we examine the
effect of multiple-tiers copayment structure on the PDP bids. We also measure how the
relationship between the copayment structure and the plan bids varies by tier. As such,
we can assess the copayment elasticity across tiers.
Further, we decompose plan bid and premium changes between 2006 and 2008
into two components, the proportion due to changing plan characteristics and the
proportion due to changes in the marginal prices associated with plan characteristics.
While plan characteristics are an important determinant of bids and premiums, the
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actuarial methods used to price those characteristics are also important. Since 2006 was
the first year of the Medicare Part D program, insurers were unable to base their bids on
experience and all plans submitted manual rated bids. Starting in 2008, plans were
required to submit experience rated bids. Each plan’s 2006 experience was required to be
used to develop the 2008 bids. Due to different pricing methods, the relationship
between plan characteristics and plan bids is likely to differ between 2006 and 2008.
Finally, we measure the Medicare beneficiaries’ sensitivity to price in the PDP
market. Specifically, we will combine the approaches by Town and Liu (2003) and Frakt
and Pizer (2009) to estimate the elasticity and semi-elasticity of enrollment with respect
to PDP premiums.
The hypotheses to be tested in this dissertation include
Hypothesis 1: The tiered copayments are consistent with their actuarial values.
Hypothesis 2: The utilization control tools lower the plan bids.
Hypothesis 3: Actuarial pricing methods play an important role in explaining the
premium and bid difference between 2006 and 2008.
Hypothesis 4: Medicare beneficiaries are sensitive to PDP premiums.

3.2 Description of Data
The data used in this dissertation comes from several sources. The major source
is the CMS Prescription Drug Plan and Pharmacy Network Files. Other sources include
CMS Landscape Source Data, CMS Part D Risk Score by County Data, CMS PDP
Penetration Files and CMS monthly Enrollment Files. Some Kaiser Family Foundation
data is used, such as 2006-2007 Medicare Beneficiaries by State File. Sections 3.2.1
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through 3.2.3 describe in detail each of these data sources while section 3.2.4 describes
the construction of the datasets utilized in this dissertation.

3.2.1 Prescription Drug Plan and Pharmacy Network Files
The major data source for this dissertation is the 2006-2008 CMS prescription
drug plan and pharmacy network files. These data are public-use files available to
researchers for a fee. It contains formulary and pharmacy network data for Medicare
PDPs and MAPD plans with the exception of employer and PACE plans. These files are
updated monthly with updates being available at the end of the first week of each month.
This public file is composed of the following sub-files: Plan Information File,
Formulary File, Geographic Locator File, Beneficiary Cost File, and Pharmacy Network
File. These files contain a unique plan identifier and a formulary identifier that can be
used to combine information in these files. Figure B2 in Appendix B shows the diagram
of how these files are related. Two supporting crosswalk files are needed to interpret the
codes for the identifiers in these files.

3.2.1.1 Plan Information File
The plan information file includes organization contract number assigned by
CMS, plan identifier assigned by CMS, unique identifier assigned to the formulary,
monthly premium amount, annual deductible amount, annual ICL, regional Medicare
Advantage plan service area, PDP plan service area, state and county codes.
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The unique contract number, plan identifier and formulary identifier allow us to
link the plan information file to other files. Plans service area, state, and county
indicators were used to link with geographic information files.

3.2.1.2 Formulary File
The formulary file provided detailed formulary information including a unique
formulary identifier, the 11-digit NDC (national drug code), the tier level associated with
the NDC, indicators for quantity limits, prior authorization requirements and step therapy
requirement for each NDC.
The unique formulary identifier in this file was used to link the plan information
file.

3.2.1.3 Beneficiary Cost File
Beneficiary cost file contains plan level cost-sharing details by tier. This file also
contains contract number and plan number that can be used to link with the plan
information file to obtain the characteristics of each plan.

3.2.1.4 Pharmacy Network File
The pharmacy network file contains National Association of Boards of Pharmacy
(NABP) numbers for each network pharmacy. It includes indicators for preferred, retail,
and mail order. NABP is the independent, international, and impartial association that
assists in developing and maintaining the standards for the purpose of protecting public
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health. NABP assigns a unique seven-digit code for each licensed pharmacy in the
United States.
The Pharmacy network file also contains the common contract number and plan
number that can be used to link to the other files.

3.2.1.5 Geographic Locator File
The geographic locator file contains county code and name, state name, MA and
PDP region codes and description. CMS established 26 MA regions and 34 PDP regions
for the administration. MA regional plans and PDPs operate at the regional level. They
are required to be open to all the Medicare beneficiaries in each region they enter. The
county code, MA and PDP region codes can be used to link with the plan information file
to provide the description of service area for each plan.

3.2.1.6 Supporting Files
Two supporting files are needed to interpret the codes. One is national council for
prescription drug programs (NCPDP) data that crosswalk the unique NABP pharmacy
number to pharmacy names and addresses in the pharmacy network file. The other one is
the MediSpan or First Data Bank data to crosswalk NDCs to drug names in the formulary
file.

3.2.2 Other CMS Data
Other CMS data used include CMS Part D Risk Score by County, plan enrollment
data, PDP Penetration data, and PDP landscape file, etc. These data are updated on either
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a monthly or an annual basis. All of these data are open to public and can be downloaded
from the CMS website.

3.2.2.1 Part D Risk Score File
CMS Part D Risk Score by County provide the county level Part D risk scores.
Only 2006 Part D risk scores were released by CMS. CMS released county level risk
score data to help insurance companies prepare for the 2006 Part D bids because 2006
was the first year of the Medicare Part D program and all plans lacked Medicare
beneficiaries’ Part D risk scores. After 2006, the Part D plans obtained their members’
risk scores and CMS no longer released the risk score information. In this dissertation,
the 2006 PDP level risk scores were weighted by over 65 populations in each county at
the end of each year (2005-2007) to derive the 2006-2008 PDP region level risk scores.

3.2.2.2 PDP Penetration File
CMS started releasing the MA and PDP state-county penetration data on its
website since May 2008. These files provide information on the number of Medicare
beneficiaries, the number of enrolled, and penetration rate by county. In this dissertation,
we converted this county level information to PDP region level information. Since the
number of Medicare beneficiaries varies slightly by month, the 2008 Medicare
beneficiaries in each PDP region were represented by the monthly average of the
Medicare beneficiaries from May 2008 to September 2008 (the latest information when
building the models).
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3.2.2.3 CMS PDP Monthly Enrollment File
CMS has been releasing the plan enrollment data for MAPDs and PDPs on its
website since 2006. The plan level enrollment information was updated in 2006 and
2007. Unfortunately, only July enrollment data are available for 2006 and 2007. Since
May 2008, this information has been updated on a monthly basis. For consistency, July
2006, July 2007 and July 2008 plan enrollment data were used.

3.2.2.4 CMS Landscape File
Since 2006 CMS has been releasing the CMS MAPD Landscape Source Data and
PDP Landscape Source Data on an annual basis. These files are generally released two
or three months before the calendar year starts. Starting in 2008, the special need plans
for dual eligibles or institutional members have been released separately. These files
provides the basic plan information, such as contract ID, plan ID, annual deductible, plan
type, plan member premium, service area, etc. The service area in the MAPD files and
special need plan files is shown by county while the service area in the PDP files is
shown by state.

3.2.3 Other Data
The 2006-2007 Medicare beneficiary count data were originally released by
CMS, but are no longer available on the CMS website. These data were obtained from
Kaiser Family Foundation. Kaiser Family Foundation is a US based non-profit private
operating foundation focusing on the major health care issues facing the nations. It
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provides summarized updated health data, policy and other healthcare related information
obtained from CMS, states and other sources in a timely manner.
In this dissertation, the state level information in these files was converted to
PDP region level information in order to merge with other files.

3.2.4 Data Compilation
The focus of this dissertation is on the stand-alone PDP’s. The premiums (bids)
of the MAPDs are mainly determined by the medical benefits, such as inpatient,
outpatient, and physician services. Although these plans also cover prescription drugs,
the portion of bids for providing drug benefits cannot be separated. Therefore, this
dissertation excluded MAPDs and measures PDPs only. In addition, we study the PDPs
in the Unites States only and the PDPs in the territories of the United States, such as
Puerto Rico were excluded.
By examining the data more carefully, we found and removed some outliers. For
example, there is one plan in 2006 (contract ID S5585, plan ID 001) which charged an
unreasonably high premium for providing the defined standard benefits. As a result, this
plan failed to enroll any members. This plan was likely priced incorrectly and therefore
was excluded. Sixteen plans that offered defined standard benefits had only one tier on
their formulary files with 25% coinsurance. It is likely these plans put all the drugs (both
generic drugs and brand name drugs) on one tier. Since the focus of this dissertation is
on the tiered copayment structure, these plans were excluded.
Each contact has a unique contract ID approved by CMS and each plan under the
same contract has a unique plan ID. Each formulary file also has a unique formulary ID.
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These IDs together with the geographic identifier were used to merge the files described
above. For example, formulary IDs were used to combine the formulary file and the plan
information file. Contract ID and plan ID were used to combine the plan information
file, beneficiary cost sharing file, CMS enrollment data, and CMS landscape source data.
The PDP region number was used to combine the plan information file with the Part D
risk score file and Medicare beneficiary file.
Most plans covered medications in four tiers, including tier 1 for generic drugs,
tier 2 for preferred brand drugs, tier 3 for non-preferred brand drugs, and tier 4 for
specialty and injectable drugs. Some plans choose not to offer tier 3 or tier 4. In this
case, tier 3 or tier 4 are coded as uncovered. Some plans do not offer the typical four
tiers. For example, some plans may offer 5 tiers by breaking tier 1 into preferred generic
and non-preferred generics. In this case, we converted it into the typical four tiers by
combining the preferred generic and non-preferred generic tiers into one tier of generics.
Some plans switched the tier orders, for example, they cover specialty drugs on tier 3 and
non-preferred brand drugs on tier 4. In this case, the tiers are reconstructed to the typical
four tier structure.

3.3 Description of Variables
This section describes the variables from a modeling perspective, i.e., dependent
and independent variables.
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3.3.1 Dependent Variables
Three dependent variables are selected depending on the modeling purposes and
needs in this dissertation. To test Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, plan bid was chosen as
the dependent variable. As introduced in Chapter One, the Medicare member premium is
only 25.5 % of the total plan cost on average. The remaining is paid by the federal
government in terms of subsidies. Similar to the member premiums in the commercial
insurance market, the plan bids of the PDPs capture the total plan cost of providing the
prescription drug coverage. Therefore, we selected the plan bid as the dependent variable
instead of the member premiums.

Table 2 National Average Part D Numbers

Year
2006
2007
2008

Bid
$97.00
$80.43
$80.52

Basic Premium
$33.00
$27.35
$27.93

Direct Subsidy
$64.00
$53.08
$52.59

The bid each plan submitted to CMS is composed of two parts, the basic member
premium and government direct subsidy. These amounts are required to be submitted to
CMS at a normalized risk score (1.0) base to facilitate the calculation of risk adjusted
payments. As introduced in Chapter One, the basic member premium is also determined
by the national average bid, which is also normalized at the risk score of 1.0. For
reference, the national average bid, national average member basic premium, and national
average government direct subsidy from year 2006 to 2008 are summarized in Table 2.
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The federal reinsurance which is used together with national average bid to determine the
national average premium is not included.
The difference between plan bid and national average bid becomes the member’s
liability. In other words, the members must pay the national average premium plus any
difference between the plan’s bid and the national average bid. For the defined standard,
actuarial equivalent, and basic alternative plans, members are only required to pay a basic
premium while members enrolled in the enhanced alternative plans have to pay a
supplemental premium in addition to the basic premium. The supplemental premium is
not part of, but in addition to the plan bid. Different from the bid, it is based on the
projected risk score, not the normalized risk score of 1.0.
However, the actual plan bid submitted to CMS is not directly obtainable. The
available data only contains the information of total member premiums. For the
enhanced alternative plans, the split of the premium (basic vs. supplemental) is
unobtainable either.
Fortunately, using the national average bids and national average member basic
premiums in Table 2, we were able to reconstruct the bids using the following steps.
(1) Calculate the national average direct subsidy as the difference of the national
average bid and the national average member basic premium.
(2) Add the national average direct subsidy by year to the member total premiums of
each plan.
In summary, we computed the plan bid as the sum of member premium and
government direct subsidy for the basic benefit package assuming a risk score of 1.0. For
the standard, actuarially equivalent, and basic alternative plans, the plan bid is simply
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calculated as the sum of member premium and the national average direct subsidy, which
equals the actual bids that each firm submitted to CMS. For the enhanced alternative
plans, the actual bids submitted by the firm cannot be calculated with available data.
Only total member premiums were reported which represents the beneficiary share of
standard benefits and the total cost of the enhanced benefits. As with the other plans, the
bid is computed as the sum of the member premium and government subsidy, but the
computed “bid” differs from the actual bid submitted to CMS. The computed bid
represents the cost of providing the basic benefits (at risk score equal to 1.0) plus the
actual expected cost of providing the enhanced benefits, not simply the expected cost of
providing the basic benefits.
The per member per month bid is transformed into the natural logarithm due to
the skewed distribution of the variable. Using the transformed variable, White’s (1980)
test for heterskedasticity did not reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. We also
did the normality testing for the log transformed bid. As shown in Appendix B Figure 1,
it is approximately normally distributed.
Other functional forms of the dependent variable were attempted too. For
reference, we have provided, in Appendix A, the estimation results of using the square
root transformation. Instead of plan bid, we also attempted to use the member premium
as the dependent variable. Relevant results are presented in the Appendix A for the
purpose of comparison.
To test Hypothesis 3, we used both the plan bid and plan premiums as the
dependent variables. Logarithm transformation was applied to both variables.
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For Hypothesis 4, each plan’s market share was used as the dependent variable.
The market share is calculated as the ratio of each plan’s enrollment divided by the total
number of Medicare beneficiaries in each PDP region.

3.3.2 Explanatory Variables
For clarity, we categorized the explanatory variables into six groups, including
plan benefit variables, plan characteristic variables, formulary variables, time variables,
and market characteristics variables.
The plan benefit variables used in this dissertation include annual deductible, tier
1 copayment, tier 2 copayment, tier 3 coinsurance, and tier 4 coinsurance. In the dataset,
some plans offer flat copayments while some plans offer coinsurance (as a percentage of
the total drug cost). In order to measure the benefits on the same base, tier 1 and tier 2
coinsurance were converted to copayments while tier 3 and tier 4 copayments were
converted to coinsurance using the national median drug costs on each tier (Appendix A,
Table A1). For tier 3 and tier 4, we used coinsurance instead of copayment because
coinsurance can capture the fact that some plans don’t cover tier 3 or tier 4 drugs.
According to Kaiser Family Foundation’s in-depth examination on the formularies of
Medicare drug plans in 2006, the median price of generic drugs is $18.11 per script and
the median price of brand name drugs is $92.16. For plans that offer tier 1 coinsurance,
the tier 1 copayment is calculated as the product of tier 1 coinsurance and the average
generic drug cost of $18. Similarly, for plans that offer tier 2 coinsurance, the tier 2
copayment is calculated as the product of tier 2 coinsurance and the average brand name
drug cost of $92. For plans that offer tier 3 copayments, the tier 3 coinsurance is
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calculated as tier 3 copayments divided by the average brand name drug cost of $92. For
plans that offer tier 4 copayments, the tier 4 coinsurance is calculated as tier 4
copayments divided by $600 which is the minimal specialty drug cost per script defined
by CMS. For plans that do not cover tier 3 or tier 4 drugs, the coinsurance is set to be
100%.
Three dummy variables capturing the plan characteristics are included. The first
one is whether the plan charges $0 premium to members eligible for full LIS. In other
words, these plans can be treated as benchmark plans which aim to enroll the low income
people and their main revenue source is the government. The second one is whether the
plan offers generic drug coverage in the gap or “donut hole”. The third one is whether
the plan offers all drugs coverage (both generic drugs and brand name drugs) in the
“donut hole”. The coverage gap or “donut hole” as a special feature of the Medicare
standard plans aimed to control total drug spending. Some enhanced alternative plans
(approximately 25% of the plans in the sample) choose to cover generic drugs or all
drugs in the “donut hole” to attract Medicare beneficiaries to enroll.
The formulary variables selected include the numbers of drugs on tier 1 to tier 4.
The number of drugs on tier 1 or tier 2 was transformed by natural logarithm function
while the number of drugs on tier 3 or tier 4 was kept at the level due to fact that some
plans do not cover tier 3 or tier 4 drugs. In addition, we also included the utilization
control tool variables, including the numbers of drugs subject to quantity limit, prior
authorization, and step therapy.
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The PDPs are offered by contract year, which coincide with the calendar year. As
the data used in this dissertation contains the PDPs from 2006 to 2008, two year dummy
variables were used to capture the time effects. They are Year07 and Year08 with year
2006 as the reference year.
The PDPs are offered at a regional level, and a PDP is required to open to all
Medicare beneficiaries in the region. Market characteristic data include beneficiary
health status, market size, and the number of competing plans in each PDP region.
Beneficiary health status is measured using the average 2006 Part D risk score in the
region. The risk score is derived from a prospective model designed to predict
medication needs in next year based on observed diagnoses in the prior year. Interested
readers can refer to Robst, Levy, and Ingber (2007) for a detailed description of the Part
D risk adjustment model. Only the 2006 county level risk score data were available from
CMS. Thus the county level risk scores were assumed constant from 2006 to 2008. The
calculated risk scores by PDP region from 2006 to 2008 are presented in Appendix A,
Table A2.
Market size is defined as the number of Medicare beneficiaries in each PDP
region, which is presented in Appendix A, Table A3.
Another market characteristic variable is the number of competing PDPs within
each PDP region. This variable captures the competition level within each PDP market.

3.4 Methodology
This section describes the methodology used to test our hypotheses. Hedonic
pricing model is used to test Hypotheses 1 and 2. The decomposition method by
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Neumark is used to test Hypothesis 3. A mean utility logit model is used to test
Hypothesis 4. In addition, we also discuss some empirical problems and the strategies we
used to construct our models.

3.4.1 Hedonic Pricing Model
The term “hedonics” is derived from Greek word hedonikos, which means
“related to pleasure”. The term is frequently used by both economists and scientists in
other fields. It simply means that one item or measure is judged better than another. In
the economic context, “hedonics” refers to the utility or satisfaction one derives through
the consumption of goods or services. The essence of hedonic pricing is that the price of
good is related to the attributes of the product. Hedonic pricing models examine the
relationship between the observed prices and the attributes of the product. In this sense,
it estimates the implicit price of each attributes the product has, or the consumer’s
willingness to pay for certain attributes associated with the product of interest.
Two researchers have made major contributions to the theoretical work on
Hedonic pricing. Lancaster (1966) developed a new approach to consumer theory. He
broke away from the traditional approach that goods are the direct objects of utility.
Instead, he supposed that it is the properties or characteristics from which utility is
derived, or the consumer’s preferences are exercised. Rosen (1974) formulated a theory
of hedonic prices as a problem in the economy of spatial equilibrium in which the entire
set of implicit prices guide both consumer and producer locational decisions in
characteristics space. Both approaches linked the observed product prices and the
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specific amounts of characteristics associated with each good defining a set of implicit or
“hedonic” prices.
Rosen also advanced the hedonic pricing theory by identifying the inverse
demand curve and examined both consumer and supplier decisions in a perfectly
competitive market. Specifically he built the hedonic pricing model through two distinct
stages. In the first stage, the marginal or implicit price function was estimated using the
regression of the product price on the characteristics. In the second stage, the inverse
demand curve or the marginal willingness-to-pay function was derived by taking the first
derivative of the implicit price function estimated in stage one.
Other researchers also made considerable contributions to the development of
hedonic pricing theory, such as relaxing the assumptions of perfect competition in
hedonic pricing models. Lucas (1977) included buyer characteristics and Berndt (1995)
added firm effects.
Recently, the hedonic pricing has been used in the health insurance market.
Using a hedonic pricing model, Jensen and Morrisey (1990) measured the relationship
between group health insurance premiums and policy characteristics including plan
benefits, cost-sharing and out-of-pocket expense limits. They also considered other
group (buyer) characteristics, such as location and industry of the enrollee, and plan
(supplier) characteristics, such as whether it is a self-insured plan or a commercial plan.
More recently, Robst (2006) used a hedonic pricing model to examine the Medigap
insurance premiums and estimated the marginal prices for Medigap benefits. He
considered both product attributes, and buyer/supplier characteristics.

53

In this dissertation, we proposes to use a hedonic pricing model to estimate the
bid (price) of PDPs as a function of plan characteristics, the characteristics of PDP
regions, and the characteristics of insurance companies (see Equation (3.1)).

Bid ijk = f ( Plan i , PDP _ region j , Insurer k )

(3.1)

where i indexes PDP plans, j indexes PDP regions and k indexes insurers. Bidijk is the
monthly bid for plan i offered in region j by insurer k.; Plani represents a vector of plan
characteristics including cost-sharing, formulary etc; PDP_regionj represents a vector of
CMS defined PDP region (one or more states) characteristics; Insurerk represents a vector
of insurance company characteristics.

3.4.1.1 Missing Variable Problem
Assuming a linear specification in parameters and using the natural logarithm
transformation of the PDP bid, Equations (3.1) can be more specifically written as:

Ln( Bid ijk ) = β 0 + β1 Plani + β 2 PDP _ region j + β 3 Insurerk + β 4Yeart + u i

(3.2)

To account for time effects, we added a vector of year dummy variables (Yeart).
ui represents the error term.
Assuming that the model specification in Equation 4.2 is correct, we cannot
directly estimate this model due to some missing variables. Many firm level
characteristics such as discounts negotiated with drug companies are not public
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information. However, these variables are likely to be correlated with the plan benefit
variables. For example, plans that receive higher discounts from their PBM (pharmacy
benefit manager) are likely to offer richer benefits or lower member cost sharing. Simply
excluding these variables will make the model suffer from the omitted variable problem
and cause the estimation to be biased.

3.4.1.2 Firm Fixed Effects Model Specification
In order to account for the missing firm level characteristics, a firm fixed effects
model is proposed under the assumption that firm level variables are time-invariant. This
is not an unreasonable assumption as most insurance companies keep the same PBM over
years and the PBM contracts are not likely to change significantly over years. Use of the
firm fixed effects model will remove insurer characteristics and produce consistent
estimates for the plan characteristic variables and market characteristic variables.
The fixed effects transformation, also called within transformation, is obtained by
first averaging equation (3.2) for all plans offered by the same contract at year t for all
contracts, resulting in the following equation:

________

_____

_______

Ln( Bidk ) = β 0 + β1 plank + β 2 PDP _ region jk + β 3 Insurerk + β 4 Year tk + u k

_____

_________

(3.3)

where Ln ( Bid k ) is the average plan bid and plan k is the averaged plan characteristics
in the same contract k, Insurer k is the averaged insurer characteristics,
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PDP _ region jk is the averaged PDP characteristics, and u k is the average error for
contract k .
Next, to erase the insurer characteristics, Equation (3.3) is subtracted from
Equation (3.2), resulting in Equation (3.4).

_____

_____

Ln( Bid ) i − Ln( Bid ) k = β1 ( plani − plank ) + β 2 ( PDP _ region j − PDP _ region jk ) +
______

β 3 ( Insurerk − Insurer jk ) + β 4 (Yeart − Yeartk ) + (ui − u k )
_____

_________________

_______

= β1 ( plani − plan k ) + β 2 ( PDP _ region j − PDP _ region jk ) + β 4 (Yeart − year tk ) + (u i − u k )

Or, we can simply write:
••

••

••

••

••

Ln( Bid ) i = β 1 Plan i + β 2 PDP _ region j + β 4 Year t + u i

(3.4)

••

where Ln( Bid ) i = Ln( Bid ) i − Ln( Bid ) k is the contract-demeaned data on the plan bids,
••

••

••

••

and similarly for Plan i , PDP _ region j , Year t and u i .
The fixed effect model assumes strict erogeneity of the explanatory variables on
the unobserved effects, which can be expressed as Equation (3.5).

E (u i | Plan i , PDP _ region j , Insurerk ) = 0 .

(3.5)

For the fixed effect analysis, E ( Insurerk | Plan i , PDP _ region j ) is allowed to be
any functions of the explanatory variables.
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Equation (3.4) can be estimated using standard econometric methods, such as
Ordinary Least Square (OLS), given Equation (3.5) is satisfied and no unobserved
heterogeneity. However, the interpretation of the estimated coefficients of β s is based on
Equation (3.2).

3.4.2 Decomposition Model

Oaxaca (1973) developed empirical techniques to decompose the wage difference
between men and women into two components. The first component is the proportion of
the wage gap due to difference in characteristics between men and women while the
second component is the proportion due to difference in the returns to those
characteristics. Neumark (1988) built on Oaxaca’s method to develop a general
theoretical model of employer discriminatory behavior.
Here we follow Neumark’s approach to decompose the plan bid and premium
difference between 2006 and 2008. Let Ln ( Bid 2006 ) and Ln ( Bid 2008 ) be the mean of the
natural logarithm transformed plan bids for 2006 and 2008, respectively. The average
difference in 2006 bids and 2008 bids can be expressed as:

Ln( Bid 2008 ) − Ln( Bid 2006 ) = ΔX 'β + [ X ' 2008 ( β 2008 − β ) − X ' 2006 ( β 2006 − β )]

(3.6)

where X ' 2006 and X ' 2008 are vectors containing the means of the explanatory variables for
2006 and 2008 samples respectively, while ΔX ' = X ' 2008 − X ' 2006 . β 2006 and β 2008 are the
estimated coefficients from estimating equation (3.2) separately for each year, and β is
estimated coefficients using combined data from both years. The coefficients represent
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the marginal price of the associated plan characteristics. The first term on the right hand
side of Equation (3.6) is the proportion of bid difference that is due to changes in plan
characteristics while the second term is the proportion of the difference due to changes in
pricing associated with plan characteristics.

3.4.3 Premium Elasticities
This section discusses the methodology for estimating the premium elasticities.
Section 3.4.3.1 introduces Berry’s mean utility function. Section 3.4.3.2 discusses, in
detail, the instrument variables and 2SLS specification. Finally, Section 3.4.3.3 presents
the premium elasticity definition.

3.4.3.1 Mean Utility Function
Berry (1994) developed a discrete choice model to measure the endogenously
determined price by price-setting firms. Specifically, a utility logit model was used to
estimate demand parameters under imperfect competition in markets with product
differentiation. Berry’s approach is well suited to the PDP market (Frakt and Pizer,
2009).
This study follows Berry’s (1994) approach by assuming the consumer indirect
utility function as:
U ijr = α Pr emium jr + β Plan jr + δMarket r + ξ f + ε ijr

(3.7)

where, i indexes individual, j indexes the plan, f denotes firms, and r indexes PDP
regions. Pr emium jr is a scalar for plan premium; Plan jr is a vector of plan characteristics;
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Marketr is a vector of market characteristics; ξ f indicates unobservable firm
characteristics; and ε ijr denotes the random error. According to the utility theory, a
Medicare beneficiary chooses the plan that maximizes his or her utility. Utility is a
function of the plan premium and known plan characteristics including member cost
sharing, drugs on the formulary, and coverage in the gap. Market characteristics
(regional risk scores and the number of competing PDPs) were also included in the utility
function assuming that the utility derived may be a function of health, and that
individuals benefit from competition both directly (through lower premiums) and
indirectly (due to better customer service, more choices).
Assuming the random error ε ijr is independently and identically distributed across
individuals, regions and products, the individual’s choice of PDPs can be modeled using
a conditional logit model (Berry, 1994). Equation (3.7) can be rewritten as the following
linear marker share equation (Town and Liu, 2003):
Ln(Pr jr ) − Ln(Pr0 r ) = α Pr emium jr + βPlan jr + δMarketr + ξ f

(3.8)

where Prjr is the probability of an individual in region r choosing plan j. Pr0r is the
probability of an individual in the same region not choosing a PDP, instead choosing an
outside good.
The outside good is defined using two different approaches. First, Frakt and
Pizer’s approach is used by defining a “composite good” that is consumed by Medicare
beneficiaries who are not enrolled in any PDPs. Second, MAPDs are explicitly defined
as the outside good, which is similar to Town and Liu’s approach of defining the
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Medigap policies as the outside good of Medicare HMOs. Medigap plans are viewed as
the alternative to MA coverage because the majority of Medicare FFS members who are
not enrolled in Medicare HMOs supplement their coverage with Medigap policies. This
reasoning also applies to the Medicare Part D market since Medicare beneficiaries who
do not enroll in PDPs are most likely to enroll in MAPDs. In the second approach, the
premium in Equation (3.8) becomes the difference between the PDP premium and the
average MAPD premium in the same PDP region. MAPDs are responsible for medical
care and prescription drug coverage. Premiums for medical and drug coverage are not
reported separately. Thus, the Part D premium for MAPD plans in each region is
calculated as the difference between the average premium for MAPD plans and MA-only
plans.
While MAPDs are the most common alternative to PDPs, there is not a direct
correlation between service areas of managed care plans and PDPs. PDPs must offer
products in an entire region, while managed care plans can offer products in specific
counties. Given that managed care plans tend to focus on urban areas, individuals in
some rural areas may not have a MAPD option. However, while acknowledging this
shortcoming, most enrollees have a MAPD option and thus the effect on the estimated
price elasticity is examined by explicitly including this option in the utility function.
Using market shares as an empirical measure of the probability of enrollee
choices, Equation (3.8) can be rewritten as:
Ln( MS jr / MS 0 r ) = α Pr emium jr + βPlan jr + δMarket r + ξ f
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(3.9)

where MSjr is the market share of plan j in region r and MSor is the market share of the
outside good in region r. In order to remove company-specific unobserved characteristics
from the error terms in Equation (3.9), firm fixed effects models are estimated by
including categorical variables ( ξ f ) for each firm in the specification.

3.4.3.2 Instrumental Variables
OLS estimation of Equation (3.9) generates biased results because the plan
premium is likely to be correlated with ξ f . It is standard to assume plan characteristics to
be exogenous leaving only the possibility of endogenous premiums (Frakt and Pizer,
2009). Thus, two-stage least squares (2SLS) is used to obtain unbiased estimates.
Valid instruments must be correlated with the plan premium but not with
unobservable factors that affect utility. Town and Liu’s approach is followed by
selecting the maximum, minimum, and mean premiums of the plans offered by the same
insurance company in other PDP regions as instruments. These premiums are suitable for
instruments because shocks to the marginal cost are reflected in changes in premiums in
other regions, holding the characteristics in other regions constant, and those shocks are
uncorrelated with the change in plan quality (Town and Liu, 2003). The mean number of
competing MAPDs and PDPs in those regions are also included among the instruments
leading to a total of five instruments for one endogenous variable.

3.4.3.2 Premium Elasticity Definition
The premium elasticity and semi-elasticity of demand are calculated for PDP
enrollees using definitions by Dowd et al. (2003). The estimated coefficient on the
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∧

relative premium ( α in Equation (3.9)) can be transformed into the average plan-level
premium elasticity of demand, ε , using Equation (3.10). The percent change in market
share due to $1 change in premium is given by the semi-elasticity, k , using Equation
(3.11).
∧

___

_____________

ε = α × (1 − MS ) × Pr emium
∧

(3.10)

___

k = α × (1 − MS)
___

(3.11)

__________ ___

where, MS and Pr emium are the sample average market share and premium across all
regions.
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Chapter Four
Research Results

This chapter presents our research results. Section 4.1 presents descriptive
statistics of the variables, and the results of the hedonic pricing model with firm fixed
effects. Section 4.2 discusses the decomposition model results. Section 4.3 describes
statistics of the variables used in the OLS and 2SLS models and presents the model
estimates, together with the PDP premium elasticities.

4.1 Hedonic Pricing Model Results
The following section describes the summary statistics of the final dataset used in
the hedonic pricing models to test Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. Statistical data
analysis and fixed effects model estimation results are also discussed in detail in this
section.

4.1.1 Descriptive Statistics
The sample used for estimating the firm fixed effects model includes 5,101 stand
alone PDPs with 1,414 in 2006, 1,865 in 2007, and 1,822 in 2008. 89% of the plans are
alternative plans and 25% of the plans offer some coverage in the “donut hole”. The
descriptive statistics of the variables in this sample are shown in Table 3.
As shown in Table 3, the dependent variable varies significantly from the lowest
plan bid of $62.39 offered by Well Point, Inc. in 2008 to the highest plan bid of $188.78
offered by United Health Group in 2007. The average plan bid is $94.08. Consistent
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with the plan bid, the member premium varies significantly too, from the lowest member
premium of $1.87 offered by Humana in 2006 to the highest member premium of
$135.70 offered by United Health Care Group in 2007. It is interesting to see that both
the highest bid and the lowest bid are offered by large insurance companies.
Significant variations were also found for majority of the explanatory variables in
the sample. For example, tier 1 copayment for generic drugs ranges from $0 to $25 with
an average of $5. Tier 2 copayment for preferred brand name drugs ranges from $10 to
$73 with an average of $28. Instead of using fixed copayments, coinsurance is used for
tier 3 and tier 4 member cost sharing. Average coinsurance is 67% for tier 3 medications
(drugs) and 36% for tier 4 medications. The maximum coinsurance in tier 3 and tier 4 is
100%, which indicates the plan does not offer medications in these tiers. Such
medications may be covered in a lower tier or not covered at all. The minimum values of
tier 3 and tier 4 are 25% and 4% coinsurance respectively, which indicates that members
enrolled in these plans only pay 25% or 4% of the total drug cost.
Most firms offer a considerable number of medications on their formulary. For
the purposes of this study, each NDC is considered to be a “medication”. NDC refers to
the “National Drug Code”, which is a unique 11-digit, 3-segment number assigned to
each medication listed under the Section 510 of the U.S. Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act. The first segment identifies the manufactures; the second segment
identifies a specific strength, dosage form and formulation for a particular firm; the third
segment identifies the package size.
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics of Variables for the Firm Fixed Effects Model
(n=5,101)
Variables
Bid
Premium
Cost sharing
Tier 1copayment
Tier 2 copayment
Tier 3 coinsurance
Tier 4 coinsurance
# drugs on each tier (in thousands)
# drugs on tier 1
# drugs on tier 2
# drugs on tier 3
# drugs on tier 4
Utilization controls (in thousands)
Quantity limits
Prior authorization
Step therapy
Other population and plan characteristics
Risk score
Medicare population (in millions)
LIS_0prem
Deductible
Gap coverage (Generics only)
Gap coverage (All Drugs)
Year 2007
Year 2008

Mean
94.08
38.15

STD
17.14
16.53

5.16
28
0.67
0.36

3.3
7.44
0.24
0.23

4,162
1,136
1,093
365

Max
Min
188.78 62.39
135.7 1.87

25
73
1
1

0
10
0.25
0.04

5,623 106,958
581 10,910
1,652 20,863
393
4,559

599
410
0
0

756
525
76

2,414
412
220

37,001
3,829
3,687

4
13
0

0.99
1.31
0.3
96.92
0.25
0.01
0.37
0.36

0.04
0.98
0.46
122.79
0.43
0.11
0.48
0.48

1.05
4.47
1
275
1
1
1
1

0.91
0.05
0
0
0
0
0
0

In this dataset, the average number of generics on tier 1 is over 4,000 and there
are over 1,000 preferred brand name medications on an average formulary. The tier with
fewest medications is tier 4 (specialty drugs), which has 365 medications on an average
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formulary. The number of medications on each tier varies significantly. Specifically, tier
1 medications range from 599 to over 100,000 and tier 2 medications range from 410 to
over 10,000. Some plans do not offer tier 3 or tier 4 while some other plans cover over
20,000 non-preferred drugs and thousands of specialty drugs.
The drugs that have utilization control represent a fairly small percentage of the
sample, approximately 11% with quantity limits, 8% required for prior authorization, and
1.1% required for step therapy on an average formulary. As seen, quantity limits are
most commonly used and step therapy is least commonly used. Overall, some plans have
a few medications subject to utilization control while other plans put thousands of
medications under utilization control.
Not surprisingly, the average risk score (.99) is close to the intended national
average of 1.0. The budget neutrality requires the national average risk score to be
normalized at 1.0 every year. Medicare advantage plans actively seek coding
improvements to increase their members’ risk scores in order to receive more money
from CMS. However, Medicare payments come from a fixed pool of money. If increase
in risk scores causes the total Medicare spending to increase from previous year, CMS
applies an adjustment factor to compensate this fluctuation.
Another market characteristic variable, the average number of Medicare
beneficiaries in each PDP region is about 1.31 million.
Only a small percentage of plans offer the defined standard benefit (11%), of
which most offer alternative plans (42%) or enhanced benefit plans (47%). The annual
deductible ranges from $0 to $275 with many firms covering a portion or all of the
deductible. The mean value of the annual deductible is $96.92. Approximately 25% of
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plans offer generic drug coverage and 1.2% of plans offer both generic and brand name
drug coverage in the donut hole. 30% of the plans in this sample enrolled qualified lowincome Medicare beneficiaries with $0 member premium.
The mean values of plan bid amounts and member premiums by year are shown
in Appendix A (Table A5). The average plan bid is $94.10 and the average member
premium is $38.16 over the three-year study period. The average plan bid in 2006 is
highest at $101.48 while the average plan bid in 2007 is the lowest at $89.89.
Consistently, the average member premium is the lowest at $36.81. However, the highest
average member premium ($40.04) was found in 2008.
The mean values of plan bid amounts and member premiums are also shown by
PDP region in Appendix A (Table A6). These mean values across PDP regions are
relatively stable. The highest average bid ($97.21) and member premiums ($41.23) were
found in PDP region 15 (Indiana and Kentucky). However, the regions with lowest
average bid and lowest member premium ($89.87) differ. PDP region 26 (New Mexico)
has the lowest average bid at $89.87 and the PDP region 32 (California) has the lowest
member premium at $33.89. Given all other factors constant higher risk regions are
expected to have higher bids for taking more risk. However these unadjusted mean
values are not consistent with the average Part D risk score in each PDP region. As
shown in Appendix A Table A 2, region 11 (Florida) has the highest risk score while
region 24 (Alaska) has the lowest risk score. This indicates that the plan characteristics
vary across regions.
In addition, the average PDP bid and member premium across contracts vary
considerably as shown in Appendix A (Table A7). The number of plans each contract
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offers differs, from 1 to 306. There are four contracts that have the highest number of
plans (306) for the three-year study period, which are offered by Cigna, Universal
American Corporation, Aetna, and United Health Group. Contract S5932 offered by
Healthspring, Inc. had the lowest average bid ($75.56) and the lowest member premium
($22.26). Contract S4231 offered by United Health Care, Inc. has the highest average bid
($139.44) and member premium ($75.44).
However, by simply looking at these unadjusted average plan bids and member
premiums, we cannot draw any conclusions about the relationship between the
firm/market characteristics and plan bids.

4.1.2 Statistical Analysis
To identify the relationship between the plan bids and member cost sharing, the
average plan bids across cost sharing rates are summarized in Table 4.
As expected, tier 1 copayments tend to be low in order to encourage the use of
generic medications. Tier 2 copayments are much higher for preferred brand
medications. Approximately 20% of the plans do not offer medications in tier 3. Of
those that do, coinsurance rates are quite high with more than half of the plans requiring
over 50% of the cost to be borne by the consumer. The high rates are intended to
encourage enrollees to use preferred brand name medications. Specialty medications are
typically covered in tier 4. Most plans offer coverage of some specialty medications, of
which coinsurance rates are lower than the coinsurance of the non-preferred brand
medications. This is not surprising because CMS requires that the maximum member
coinsurance of specialty drugs shall not exceed 33%.
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However, by looking at the average bids we cannot identify a consistent trend.
While bids are expected to decline as cost sharing increased, none of the tiers exhibit
such a monotonic relationship. For tier 1, plans with medium level costing sharing has
the lowest average bid, but for tier 2 plans with the highest level cost sharing has the
lowest average bid. For tier 3, although the plans without coverage on tier 3 drugs have
the lowest average bid, the medium level cost sharing is associated with the higher
average bid than the low level cost sharing. Indeed, in tier 4 the average bid increased as
enrollee cost sharing increased.

Table 4 Average Bids by Cost Sharing at Each Tier

Observations
Tier 1 copayment
$0-$4.14
$4.5-$6
$6.5-$25
Tier 2 copayment
$10-$24.5
$25-$30
$30.36-$73
Tier 3 coinsurance
≤50%
>50%
Not Covered
Tier 4 coinsurance
≤25%
>25%
Not Covered
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Average bid

1,503
2,207
1,391

$97.64
$91.14
$94.91

1,842
2,069
1,190

$90.99
$98.79
$90.68

1,283
2,745
1,073

$95.32
$95.39
$89.25

2,586
1,969
546

$92.11
$95.26
$99.23

Of course, there are numerous potential reasons for this unexpected relationship.
In Table 5, the relationship between cost sharing and other plan and market
characteristics is explored. For example, firms with lower cost sharing may have other
plan characteristics that are associated with lower or higher bids. For each tier, the
sample is divided based on enrollee cost sharing (low, medium, and high) and the average
numbers of medications available on each tier, and the percentage of medications subject
to quantity limits, prior authorization, and step therapy are examined. The enrollee cost
sharing levels (low, medium, and high) are consistent with those in Table 4. These
variables examined are treated as plan characteristics, and thus the percentages are not
specific to the medications in the tier. Each tier is treated separately, thus plans in the
lowest group for tier 1 are not necessarily in the lowest group for tier 2, tier 3 or tier 4
and vice versa.
For tier 1 the clearest finding is that plans covering more medications and
imposing fewer utilization controls tend to have higher bids. The medium cost sharing
group has the lowest average number of medications covered and also the lowest bids.
The medium cost share group also has the greatest proportion of medications subject to
quantity limits and prior authorization, which also contributes to the lower bids.
In tier 2, there is little difference in the number of brand name drugs covered as
enrollee cost sharing increases. However, the number of drugs subject to the utilization
control tools differs across levels of cost sharing. For example, quantity limits are most
common among plans with lower cost sharing. Interestingly, firms with the highest cost
sharing are the most likely to require prior authorization and step therapy. Plans with low
level and high level cost sharing have approximately the same percentage of total drugs
70

subject to the utilization control tools. These plans also the approximately same average
bid.

Table 5 Statistics by Tier Member Cost Sharing

Low

Cost sharing
Medium

High

T1 Copayment
Bid
Avg. # drugs on tier 1
Avg. # drugs on tier 2
Avg. # drugs on tier 3
Avg. # drugs on tier 4
% of drugs subject to:
Quantity limits
Prior authorization
Step therapy
Observations

$0-$4.14
$97.64
4,950
1,175
1,113
266

$4.5-$6
$91.14
3,612
1,138
1,101
374

$6.5-$25
$94.91
4,185
1,090
1,058
457

8.90%
7.50%
1.40%
1,503

14.20%
8.20%
1.10%
2,207

9.50%
7.40%
0.80%
1,391

T2 Copayment
Bid
Avg. # drugs on tier 1
Avg. # drugs on tier 2
Avg. # drugs on tier 3
Avg. # drugs on tier 4
% of drugs subject to:
Quantity limits
Prior authorization
Step therapy
Observations

$10-$24.5
$90.99
4,425
1,100
1,278
271

$25-$30
$98.79
4,441
1,174
1,275
474

$30.36-$73
$90.68
3,271
1,125
490
320

14.50%
7.10%
1.00%
1,842

9.30%
7.40%
1.00%
2,069

9.00%
10.00%
1.60%
1,190
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Table 5 Statistics by Tier Member Cost Sharing (Continued)

T3 Coinsurance
Bid
Avg. # drugs on tier 1
Avg. # drugs on tier 2
Avg. # drugs on tier 3
Avg. # drugs on tier 4
% of drugs subject to:
Quantity limits
Prior authorization
Step therapy
Observations
T4 Coinsurance
Bid
Avg. # drugs on tier 1
Avg. # drugs on tier 2
Avg. # drugs on tier 3
Avg. # drugs on tier 4
% of drugs subject to
Quantity limits
Prior authorization
Step therapy
Observations

Low
<=50%
$95.32
3,270
1,037
1,480
294

Cost sharing
Medium
High
>50%
Not Covered
$95.39
$89.25
4,261
5,027
1,133
1,271
1,306
0
374
430

16.60%
7.60%
1.50%
1,283

8.70%
8.20%
1.10%
2,745

12.40%
6.70%
0.70%
1,073

<=25%
$92.11
3,844
1,056
1,033
401

>25%
$95.26
4,074
1,118
1,141
418

Not Covered
$99.23
5,983
1,580
1,203
0

14.90%
7.00%
0.90%
2,586

7.90%
8.50%
0.90%
1,969

7.80%
8.50%
2.50%
546

A similar relationship exists between cost sharing and quantity limits for tier 3.
Plans with the lowest cost sharing are more likely to have quantity limits. Those plans
with the low and medium tier 3 cost sharing cover tier 3 medications, but also have
higher bids than plans not covering non-preferred brand name medications. The majority
of plans (2,745) charge substantial coinsurance (>50%) for non-preferred brand name
drugs, although most plans (4,028) do have some coverage for such medications.
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Similarly, most plans (4,555) offer coverage for specialty drugs (tier 4). There is
little difference in the number of specialty drugs covered between the plans charging
lower coinsurance and the plans charging higher coinsurance. These plans with lower
coinsurance have more medications subject to the utilization controls but also have higher
bids than the plans with higher coinsurance. However, plans without coverage on tier 4
drugs tend to have the highest bids, which is counterintuitive. One possibility is that
these plans placed specialty drugs on lower tiers, which resulted in higher costs to the
plans and thus the higher bids.

4.1.3 Firm Fixed Effects Model Results
Through the data discussion in the preceding section, it is difficult to draw any
quantitative conclusions on the relationship underlying the data. To further explore the
data variation, we used a firm fixed effects model. The estimation results are
summarized in Table 6, with the natural logarithm of the PMPM (per member per month)
bid as the dependent variable.
Three different specifications are attempted. The first specification includes
limited utilization control measures, namely the enrollee cost sharing variables. The
second specification adds the number of medications covered at each tier, and the third
specification adds additional utilization controls (numbers of medications subject to
quantity limits, prior authorization, and step therapy). Note that the grouping of
explanatory variables is consistent with those in Chapter Three.
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Table 6 Regression Results: Firm Fixed Effects Model
Dependent Variable: Ln (Bid)

Base
Specification

+ # Drugs
Covered

+ Utilization
Controls

-0.0037***
(0.0005)
-0.0019***
(0.0002)
-0.0018
(0.0085)
-0.0175**
(0.0082)

-0.0035***
(0.0005)
-0.0020***
(0.0002)
-0.0085
(0.0089)
-0.0289***
(0.0097)

-0.0036***
(0.0005)
-0.0023***
(0.0002)
-0.0237**
(0.0093)
-0.0223**
(0.0099)

# drugs covered
ln(# drugs on tier 1)

--

ln(# drugs on tier 2)

--

-0.0210***
(0.0042)
0.0731***
(0.0091)

-0.0227***
(0.0042)
0.0651***
(0.0092)

# drugs on tier 3
(in thousands)

--

# drugs on tier 4

--

0.0018*
(0.0010)
0.00004***
(0.0000)

-0.0045***
(0.0016)
0.00005***
(0.0000)

Cost sharing
Tier 1 copayment
Tier 2 copayment
Tier 3 coinsurance
Tier 4 coinsurance

# drugs subject to:
Quantity limits
(in thousands)

--

--

0.0048***
(0.0010)

Prior authorization
(in thousands)

--

--

-0.0373***
(0.0065)

---

---

0.0457***
(0.0075)

Step therapy
(in thousands)
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Table 6 Regression Results: Firm Fixed Effects Model
Dependent Variable: Ln (Bid) (Continued)

Other plan characteristics
Deductible
Gap coverage for generics
Gap coverage for all drugs
LIS_0prem

Year 2007
Year 2008
Regional risk score
Regional Medicare
population

N
R squared

Base
Specification

+ # Drugs
Covered

+ Utilization
Controls

-0.0003***
(0.0000)
0.1767***
(0.0037)
0.1675***
(0.0135)
-0.0551***
(0.0038)

-0.0003***
(0.0000)
0.1752***
(0.0037)
0.1824***
(0.0137)
-0.0560***
(0.0038)

-0.0003***
(0.0000)
0.1780***
(0.0037)
0.1872***
(0.0136)
-0.0527***
(0.0038)

-0.1535***
(0.0039)
-0.1182***
(0.0040)
0.2052***
(0.0405)

-0.1510***
(0.0052)
-0.1134***
(0.0060)
0.2035***
(0.0400)

-0.1603***
(0.0054)
-0.1250***
(0.0062)
0.2028***
(0.0399)

-0.0118***
(0.0016)

-0.0119***
(0.0010)

-0.0118***
(0.0015)

5,101
0.73

5,101
0.73

5,101
0.74

Notes:
(1) *** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at the 10%
level.
(2) The specification also includes a categorical variable for each firm.

Among the plan benefit variables, higher copayments for tier 1 and tier 2
medications lower bids by insurers in all three specifications. Similarly, higher
coinsurance for specialty medications lowers bids. We also find a negative relationship
between tier 3 coinsurance and plan bids in the third specifications. Overall, there is a
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negative relationship between enrollee cost sharing and the plan bid which is consistent
with actuarial principles.
Enrollee cost sharing affects plan bids in two ways. First, lower enrollee cost
sharing means the plan is responsible for larger portion of the drug cost on a per script
base. Second, lower cost sharing encourages enrollees to use more scripts of the
prescription drugs, which is called induced utilization. Through these two different ways,
lower enrollee cost sharing results in higher plan liability (claim costs). In order to cover
these claim costs and survive in the Medicare Part D market, plans need to charge higher
bids.
While the coefficients are statistically significant, the magnitude of the effects is
rather small. For example, a $1 increase in the tier 1 copayment reduces the bid by a
mere 0.36%. The marginal effect is also small for tier 2, with a $1 increase in the
copayment leading to a 0.2% reduction in bid. However, $1 represents a far larger
proportion of the median cost of a generic medication compared to the median cost of a
brand name medication. Hoadley (2006) examined the prices of the top 150 medications
in the Part D program. Based on his results, the median costs are $18.11 and $92.16 for
generic medications and brand name medications, respectively. This implies that plans
pay about $13 ($18 minus $5) for a generic medication and $64 ($92 minus $28) for a
brand name medication.
In terms of elasticity, a 10% decline in the price of a tier 1 medication (from $13
to $11.70) reduces the bid by 0.4%, while a 10% decrease in the median tier 2 medication
price (from $64 to $57.60) decreases bids by 1.4%. Despite the bid being quite inelastic,
the effect is larger for preferred brand name medications than generics. Our finding is
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consistent with the study performed by Simon and Lucarelly (2006). They found a weak
relationship between the PDP premiums and the simulated out-of-pocket payments for
different sets of drugs. Overall, the small effects suggest that firms do not expect
consumers to substantially reduce their quantity demanded in response to a change in cost
sharing. In addition, the relative higher elasticity of the preferred brand name
medications indicates that firms expect Medicare enrollees to switch to low cost generic
drugs if these generic drugs are the substitutes for the preferred brand name drugs.
Similarly, small effects exist for tier 3 and tier 4 enrollee costing sharing. For
example, as shown in the third specification in Table 6, one percentage point increase in
tier 3 enrollee cost sharing would result in a 0.02% decrease in plan bid. A plan going
from no coinsurance in tier 3 to 100% coinsurance would reduce plan bid by about 2.3%.
Similarly, the third specification in Table 6 indicates that one percentage increase in tier 4
enrollee coinsurance would reduce plan bid by approximately 0.02%. Plans going from
0% to 100% coinsurance are expected to have 2.2% lower bids.
The formulary variables that measure the number of covered medications in each
tier are significantly related to the plan bids. The number of drugs in tier 1 is inversely
related to the bid. Specifically, if the plans increase the number of generic drugs on tier 1
by 1%, the plan bid would be reduced by approximately 2.3% indicated by the third
specification in Table 6. On the other hand, the numbers of medications in tiers 2, 3, and
4 are positively related to the plan bid. The third specification in Table 6 also shows that
1% increase in the number medications in tier 2 would increase the plan bid by
approximately 6.5%. The second specification indicates an even higher increase in the
plan bid. In the third specification, the number of medication covered in tier 3 is not
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statistically significant. However, the second specification shows a positive relationship
between the number of medications in tier 3 and the plan bid. Specifically, if a plan
increases the number of non-preferred brand name drugs by 1,000, the plan bid would
increase by approximately 0.18%. Similar results are found for the number of tier 4
medications. If a plan covered 1,000 more specialty drugs, the plan bid would increase
by approximately 4% in the second specification and 5% in the third specification in
Table 6.
In conclusion, the more generic medications covered by the plan, the lower the
expected costs and the lower the plan bid. In contrast, the more brand name medications
covered by the plan, the higher the expected costs and the higher the plan bid. More
importantly, the number of medication in tier 2 shows the highest elasticity across the
four tiers, which indicates the tier shifting from the preferred brand name drugs to the low
cost generic drugs. This finding further confirms the tier shifting effect found in the
copayment elasticities.
Firms employ additional utilization control tools to control drug spending. Such
utilization controls (quantity limits, prior authorization, and step therapy) are expected to
reduce expected costs and lower plan bids. However, the results in Table 6 indicate that
only prior authorization is associated with lower bids. If a plan required prior
authorization for 1,000 more medications, the plan bid would be reduced by
approximately 3.7%. The numbers of drugs with quantity limits or requiring step therapy
are positively related to the plan bids. Contrary to expectations, adding one thousand
more medications subject to quantity limit or step therapy would increase the plan bid by
approximately 0.48% and 4.6%, respectively, according to the model results in Table 6.
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There are many possible reasons for this inconsistency. First, quantity limits and
step therapy may be put into place when insurers include very high cost medications on
their formulary. Second, quantity limits and step therapy may be difficult for plans to
actually control. For example, when the quantity limit is reached or step therapy limits
access to certain medications, Medicare enrollees may be able to switch to other
medications that have equivalent therapeutic effects. These alternative medications may
enable enrollees to work around some utilization controls. Third, quantity limits and step
therapy require approval from the insurance company, which increases administrative
costs and thus increase the plan bids. Finally and most likely, since the Medicare Part D
plans are still at their early age, the firms may not be able to sophisticatedly utilize these
complicated utilization control tools to control the drug costs as they are intended to. Or
they may not have reflected the potential savings of these tools in the plan bids.
Among the other plan characteristics, plans waiving part or all of the deductible
have higher bids than plans that require higher deductibles. According to the model
results in specification 3 in Table 6, a $100 deduction (increase) in the annual deductible
would increase (decrease) the plan bid by approximately 3%. Consistent results are
found in the first and second specifications in Table 6.
The signs and magnitudes of the other plan characteristic variables (LIS_0prem,
gap coverage of generics, and gap coverage of brand name drugs) are also expected.
Bids for plans that offer $0 premium with full low income subsidy are 5.1% lower (eβ-1
using the beta from specification #3). CMS randomly auto-assigns the new dual eligible
enrollees to the Part D plans that are below the regional low income subsidy benchmark.
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In order to get the auto-assigned members, these plans generally bid lower than the plans
that do not intend to enroll low income members.
Covering medications in the gap also increases plan bids. Plans with gap
coverage of generics have a 19% higher bid as indicated by specification 3 in Table 6.
Plans that cover brand name drugs in the gap tend to bid 20% higher than the plans that
only cover generic drugs in the gap. In total, plans covering both generic and brand name
drugs in the gap are approximately 39% higher than plans without any gap coverage. All
three specifications show consistent results in terms of sign and magnitude. Our finding
shows the huge impact of gap coverage to the plan bids. The gap or the “donut hole”
plays an important role in controlling the total drug spending as expected.
We also measured the effects of market characteristic variables. The results in
Table 6 also show that the plan bid is positively related to the PDP region Part D risk
scores. In other words, plans in high risk regions tend to bid higher for bearing higher
financial risks. Specifically regions with 10% higher risk scores tend to bid
approximately 2% higher in all three specifications. This is what we expected because
for the enhanced alternative plans, the risk scores are directly reflected in the member
supplemental premium. For the other types of plans, plans may view regions with less
healthy beneficiaries as riskier and put more margins in the bids. Cost controls may also
be deemed less effective in high risk regions.
On the other hand, the number of Medicare beneficiaries in a PDP region is
negatively correlated with plan bids. According to the actuarial pricing principles, large
population pools mitigate the plan’s potential risks. The plan bids which capture the plan
expected claim costs are expected to be lower. In addition, large population pool may
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lower per person administrative costs due to economies of scale. Specifically, an
increase of one million Medicare beneficiaries in a PDP region results in an
approximately 1.2% lower bid as illustrated in Table 6. All the three specifications show
consistent results in terms of sign and magnitude.
The results in Table 6 also show that the bids vary across years. Year 2007 bids
are found to be 15% lower and year 2008 bids are found to be 12% lower than year 2006
bids by specification 3 in Table 6. The first two specifications in Table 6 show consistent
results. These results are not surprising. Since 2006 was the first year of the Part D
program, most plans priced their bids conservatively due to the lack of any historical
information. In 2007, plans tended to price competitively after learning that the 2006
bids were overpriced and there was the potential for substantial risk corridor payments to
CMS. Plans also priced aggressively in order to increase market share. In 2008, plans
are more mature after two years of experience in the Medicare Part D market and CMS
required plans to develop 2008 bids based on the plan’s 2006 claim experience if they
had any. Thus, 2008 bids are expected to be more stable, which is consistent with our
results.

4.1.4 Low and High Risk Region Analysis
We further tested whether the relationship between the bids and the tiered
copayments differ for the plans in high risk regions versus plans in low risk regions.
Gilman and Kautter (2007) found that Medicare beneficiaries with chronic conditions are
less responsive to the cost sharing incentives of prescription drugs. In this dissertation,
we used the Part D risk scores as the proxy variable of chronic conditions or health status.
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If the insurers are sophisticated enough, they would anticipate that the cost sharing would
have a smaller marginal effect on the demand of enrollees in areas with higher risk scores
and consider this marginal effect when pricing their plan bids.

Table 7 Differentiating between Low and High Risk Regions
Dependent Variable: Ln (Bid)

Regions with risk ≥ 1
Coef
Std err
Tier 1 copayment
Tier 2 copayment
Tier 3 coinsurance
Tier 4 coinsurance
N
R squared

Regions with risk < 1
Coef
Std err

Diff

Std err

-0.0041***
-0.0022***
-0.0240*

0.0007
0.0003
0.0128

-0.0031***
-0.0025***
-0.0237*

0.0007
0.0004
0.0134

0.0010
-0.0003
0.0003

0.0010
0.0005
0.0185

-0.0235*

0.0132

-0.0191

0.0146

0.0044

0.0197

2,584
0.757

2,517
0.73

Notes: (1) *** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at 10% level.

In order to explore the effect of cost sharing in high risk areas versus low risk
areas, we separate the sample based on the average Part D risk in the region. The full
specification including all formulary and utilization control variables in Table 6 was
estimated separately for regions with risk scores less than 1.0 and for regions with risk
scores greater than or equal to 1.0. The results are provided in Table 7. We found that
cost sharing does not have significantly different effects on plan bids in PDP regions with
healthier versus less healthy residents. While the coefficients differ, none of the
differences are statistically significant. Thus, while insurers overall price plans higher
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when the residents of a region are less healthy, the marginal effect of cost sharing on plan
bids is not found to differ based on the health of residents.
While Gilman and Kautter (2007) found less elastic demand of enrollees with
chronic conditions using prescription drug claims data, we did not find such evidence in
the pricing of plan bids in our study.
The model results of the full specification are provided in Appendix A (Table A8
and Table A9).

4.1.5 Other Model Forms, Function Forms and Variables
As introduced in Chapter Three, to measure the impact of copayment structure on
the plan bids, we also attempted different set of explanatory variables and model forms.
First, the inclusion of explanatory variables denoting whether the plan was an
actuarial equivalent plan, basic alternative plan, or enhanced benefit plan was considered.
However, the characteristics that differentiate these plans are already included in the plan
benefit variables in the specification. In Chapter One, we introduced the five tests that
the alternative plans have to pass in order to get the bids approved. All the tests are
directly related to the plan benefits. In other words, the type of plan is determined by the
plan benefits including annual deductible and member cost sharing. Thus, the addition of
these variables did not add explanatory power to the model.
For comparison purposes, we ran ordinary least square (OLS) regressions with the
results summarized in the Appendix (Table A10). A majority of the explanatory
variables in the OLS model have the same signs as those in the firm fixed effects model.
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However, OLS was abandoned due to the omitted variable problem described in Chapter
Three.
Different dependent variables were attempted too. The firm fixed effects model
results using natural log transformed member monthly premium as the dependent
variable are provided in Appendix (Table A11). All the variables except for the year
dummy variables have the same sign as those in Table 6. However, the magnitudes are
significantly different. In this dissertation, we used the plan bid as the dependent variable
because it captures the total expected claim costs of the plan. The importance of using
the bid (particularly when transformed) can be seen with a simple example. Assuming a
national average bid of $90 and federal reinsurance is $10, a plan bidding $115 would
have a premium of $50.50 (25.5% of $100 plus the $25 difference between the plan bid
and national average bid). A plan bidding $90 would have a premium of $25.50. Thus, a
28 percent difference in bids leads to almost a 100 percent increase in the premium.
Finally, different functional forms of the dependent variable were attempted. The
firm fixed effects model results using square root transformed plan bid on a per-member
per-month base as the dependent variable is provided in Appendix A (Table A12). All
estimated coefficients have the same sign as those in specification 3 in Table 6. The log
transformation is finally chosen because it is more likely to resemble the relationship
between the plan bids and the explanatory variables. For example, the percentage change
in member cost sharing, number of medications, and risk scores are likely to impact the
plan bids by certain percentage, rather than fixed amounts.
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4.2 Decomposition Model Results
Different actuarial methods were used by firms to price plan bids in 2006 and
2008 (manual rating vs. experience rating). This section tests Hypothesis 3 whether the
pricing methods play an important role in determining the plan bids and premiums. First,
we compare the variable statistics in three datasets (sample of 2006 data, sample of 2008
data, and the full sample of combined 2006 and 2008 data). Following this, regression
results using the three datasets are presented. Meaningful decomposition results showing
whether the bid/premium change can be attributed to changes in plan characteristics or
marginal price associated with plan characteristics (or different pricing methods) are
discussed.

4.2.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 8 presents descriptive statistics of three samples previously described,
including 1,414 and 1,822 standalone PDPs in 2006 and 2008, respectively. The average
bid declined between 2006 and 2008 from $101 to $93, while the average premium
increased from $37 to $40. No significant change was found for the member cost sharing
variables. Cost sharing changed with insurers reducing tier 1 copayments for generics,
and increasing tier 2 copayments for preferred brand name medications. Tier 3
coinsurance stayed almost constant at .69 in 2006 and .68 in 2008. Coinsurance for tier 4
specialty medications declined from .50 to .31.
Most firms entered the program in 2006 offering a considerable number of
medications on their formulary. Firms have covered fewer medications over time as the
average number of generics on tier 1 declined from 9,375 in 2006 to 1,860 in 2008.
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Similarly, the average number of preferred brand name medications has declined from
1,508 to 937. Only tier 4 has seen an increase in the number of medications, which likely
represents some of the brand name medications no longer covered in tiers 2 and 3.

Table 8 Descriptive Statistics, (2006 and 2008 Data)

Variables

Bid
Premium
Cost sharing
Tier 1 copayment
Tier 2 copayment
Tier 3 coinsurance
Tier 4 coinsurance
# drugs on each tier
# drugs on tier 1
# drugs on tier 2
# drugs on tier 3
# drugs on tier 4

2006
2008
Full
Means
Means
Difference# Sample
(Std err)
(Std err)
(p value)
(Std err)
(N=1,414) (N=1,822)
(N=3,236)
101.48
(12.80)
37.48
(12.80)

92.63
(19.95)
40.04
(19.95)

-8.85
<.0001
2.56
0.0479

96.5
(17.74)
38.92
(17.24)

5.52
(3.20)
26.69
(8.35)
0.69
(0.24)
0.498
(0.34)

5.24
(3.44)
29.78
(7.22)
0.68
(0.24)
0.309
(0.13)

-0.28
0.0002
3.10
<.0001
-0.01
0.6964
-0.19
<.0001

5.36
(3.34)
28.43
(7.88)
0.68
(0.24)
0.392
(0.26)

9,375
(8,699)
1,508
(786)
1,515
(2,707)
284
(426)

1,860
(282)
937
(357)
834
(793)
400
(355)

-7,516
<.0001
-571
<.0001
-680
0.0336
116
<.0001

5,144
(6856)
1,186
(650)
1,131
(1916)
349
(392)
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Table 8 Continued

Variables
Utilization controls
Quantity limits
Prior authorization
Step therapy required
Other population and plan
characteristics
Risk score
Medicare Population
(in millions)
LIS_0prem
Deductible
Gap coverage (Generics)
Gap coverage (All drugs)

2006
Means
(Std err)

2008
Means
(Std err)

Difference#
(p value)

Full
Sample
(Std err)

1,414
(4,482)
662
(547)
103
(383)

552
(361)
473
(242)
79
(113)

-862
0.1283
-189
<.0001
-24
<.0001

929
(3,005)
555
(415)
90
(267)

0.99
(0.037)

0.99
(0.037)

0.00
0.400

0.99
(0.037)

1.30
(0.976)
0.28
(0.449)
90.58
(115.2)
0.16
(0.362)
0.02
(0.151)

1.33
(0.998)
0.27
(0.444)
104.85
(128.8)
0.29
(0.454)
0.00
(0.023)

0.03
0.126
-0.01
0.520
14.28
<.0001
0.13
<.0001
-0.02
<.0001

1.31
(0.988)
0.28
(0.446)
98.61
(123.3)
0.23
(0.421)
0.01
(0.102)

Note: # p-value from two tailed Mann Whitney U test.

A minority of covered medications had utilization controls such as quantity limits,
prior authorization requirements, or step therapy requirements in both years.
Approximately 11% of covered medications were subject to quantity limits in 2006.
Despite an insignificant change in the number of medications subject to quantity limits,
given the decline in the number of covered medications the percentage of covered
87

medications subject to quantity limits increased to 13.7%. While the number of
medications subject to prior authorization and step therapy declined, they also comprised
a higher percentage of covered medications in 2008. Five percent of covered medications
were subject to prior authorization in 2006 and 12% in 2008, while .8% were subject to
step therapy in 2006 and 2.0% in 2008.
In 2006, approximately 16% of the plans covered generic drugs in the coverage
gap and 2% of the plans covered brand name drugs. In 2008, 29% of the plans covered
generic drugs while less than 0.1% of the plans covered brand name drugs in the
coverage gap. Covering brand names drugs in the gap increased plan liability while
covering generic drugs in the gap encouraged enrollees to use more low-cost generic
drugs.
The average risk score was close to the national average of 1.0 in both years. The
number of plans offering $0 premium to qualified low-income people (LIS_0prem) was
consistent between the two years. The average deductible increased as CMS updated the
standard deductible amount over time.

4.2.2 Firm Fixed Effects Model Results
Table 9 presents the results from the firm fixed effects regressions using the
natural log of the per member per month bid as the dependent variable. The results from
three regression models are reported. The first uses data from 2006, the second uses data
from 2008, while the third uses the combined sample.
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In 2006, higher cost sharing was associated with lower bids. The relationship
between bids and the number of drugs covered was not strong with only the number of
tier 4 specialty medications was associated with higher bids. The only other utilization
control related to bids was the number of drugs subject to prior authorization which was
associated with lower bids. Plans with gap coverage or offered in regions with higher
risk scores had higher bids, while plans offering $0 premium low-income plans or offered
in regions with more Medicare residents had lower bids.
By 2008, the relationship between plan bids and cost sharing in tiers 1, 2, and 3
declined in magnitude. Only the tier 4 coinsurance rates became more strongly
associated with plan bids, although unexpectedly, higher cost sharing was associated with
higher plan bids. The marginal bid associated with the number of covered medications in
tiers 1 and 2 increased in magnitude. The number of covered generics had a more
negative effect on plan bids, while marginal price associated with the number of preferred
brand name medications increased. Tier 3 and tier 4 medications are not found to have a
significant impact to 2008 plan bids, although they are larger in magnitude in 2008 than
in 2006.
Among the utilization control variables, only the marginal importance of step
therapy changed significantly, although this utilization control became significantly
related to higher bids.
The relationship between other plan and population characteristics changed
differently from the 2006 sample to the 2008 sample. For example, the importance of
regional characteristics including regional Part D risk scores and number of Medicare

89

beneficiaries, declined between 2006 and 2008, while the relative importance of generic
gap coverage increased.

Table 9 Firm fixed effects Model Estimates,
Dependent Variable: Ln(Bid) (2006 and 2008 Data)

Variables
Cost sharing
Tier 1 Copay
Tier 2 Copay
Tier 3 Coinsurance
Tier 4 Coinsurance
# drugs on each tier
LN (# drugs on tier 1)
LN(# drugs on tier 2)
# drugs on tier 3 (in 1,000s)
# drugs on tier 4
Utilization controls
Quantity limits (in 1,000s)
Prior authorization (in 1,000s)
Step therapy required (in 1,000s)

2006 Sample

2008 Sample

Difference

Full Sample

-0.0107 ***
(0.0009)
-0.0021 ***
(0.0002)
-0.2099 ***
(0.0139)
0.1104
(0.1103)

-0.0036 ***
(0.0008)
-0.0009 *
(0.0006)
-0.0165
(0.0222)
0.5267 ***
(0.0962)

0.0071 ***
(0.0012)
0.0012 **
(0.0006)
0.1934 ***
(0.0262)
0.4163 ***
(0.1463)

-0.0023 ***
(0.0007)
-0.0034 ***
(0.0003)
-0.1316 ***
(0.0131)
-0.0142
(0.0125)

-0.0893
(0.1100)
0.0231
(0.0148)
-0.0071
(0.0048)
0.0018 ***
(0.0006)

-0.5449 ***
(0.1632)
0.104 **
(0.0436)
-0.0285
(0.0258)
0.0011 ***
(0.0002)

-0.4556 **
(0.1968)
0.0809 *
(0.0460)
-0.0214
(0.0263)
-0.0008
(0.0006)

0.0155 ***
(0.0044)
0.111 ***
(0.0110)
-0.0185 ***
(0.0020)
0 **
0.0000

0.001
(0.0061)
-0.1064 **
(0.0500)
0.0114
(0.0202)

-0.016
-0.017
(0.1065)
(0.1066)
-0.0433
0.0631
(0.1350)
(0.1439)
1.9315 ***
1.9201 ***
(0.2413)
(0.2422)
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0.0156 ***
(0.0013)
-0.0301 ***
(0.0075)
0.0483 ***
(0.0089)

Table 9: Continued
Variables
Other population and
plan characteristics
Risk score

2006 Sample

2008 Sample

0.3751 ***
0.053
(0.0355)
(0.0550)
Medicare Population (in millions) -0.0136 ***
-0.0065 ***
(0.0014)
(0.0021)
LIS_0prem
-0.0709 ***
-0.0147 **
(0.0038)
(0.0066)
Deductible
-0.0005 ***
-0.0002 ***
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
Gap coverage (Generics only)
0.0533 ***
0.287 ***
(0.0052)
(0.0055)
Gap coverage (All Drugs)
0.3748 ***
-0.0412
(0.0103)
(0.1045)
(N=1,414)
(N=1,822)
R-Square
0.8981
0.8679
Percent due to characteristics change
Percent due to coefficients change

Difference

Full Sample

-0.3221 ***
(0.0654)
0.0071 ***
(0.0025)
0.0562 ***
(0.0076)
0.0002 ***
(0.0000)
0.2336 ***
(0.0076)
-0.416 ***
(0.1050)

0.1959 ***
(0.0513)
-0.0101 ***
(0.0020)
-0.0517 ***
(0.0049)
-0.0004 ***
(0.0000)
0.1766 ***
(0.0048)
0.213 ***
(0.0182)
(N=3,236)
0.743
72%
28%

*** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level

At the bottom of Table 9, the coefficients along with the variable means from
Table 8 are used to estimate the percentage difference in bids due to changes in plan
characteristics and the proportion due to changes in the marginal prices associated with
the plan characteristics. Using Neumark’s (1988) approach, 72% of the difference in
plan bids is due to changes in plan characteristics while 28% of the difference is due the
marginal prices associated with the plan characteristics. Thus, the majority of the change
in bids is due to changes in the plan characteristics.
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Using the same approach, plan premium change between 2006 and 2008 is also
decomposed into characteristic change and marginal price change. Table 10 presents the
results from the firm fixed effects regressions using the natural log of member monthly
premium as the dependent variable.

Table 10 Firm fixed effects Model Estimates,
Dependent Variable: Ln(Premium) (2006 and 2008 Data)

Variables
Cost sharing
Tier 1 Copay
Tier 2 Copay
Tier 3 Coinsurance
Tier 4 Coinsurance
# drugs on each tier
LN (# drugs on tier 1)
LN(# drugs on tier 2)
# drugs on tier 3 (in 1,000s)
# drugs on tier 4
Utilization controls
Quantity limits (in 1,000s)
Prior authorization (in 1,000s)
Step therapy required (in 1,000s)

2006 Sample

2008 Sample

Difference

Full Sample

-0.0263 ***
(0.0029)
-0.0076 ***
(0.0007)
-0.2513 ***
(0.0478)
0.335
(0.3800)

-0.0112 ***
(0.0020)
-0.001
(0.0013)
-0.0318
(0.0539)
1.8003 ***
(0.2330)

0.015 ***
(0.0035)
0.0066 ***
(0.0015)
0.2196 ***
(0.0720)
1.4654 ***
(0.4458)

-0.0138 ***
(0.0018)
-0.0084 ***
(0.0008)
-0.2877 ***
(0.0324)
-0.0961 ***
(0.0309)

-0.9931 ***
(0.3792)
0.2799 ***
(0.0510)
0.023
(0.0166)
0.0051 ***
(0.0020)

-2.5928 ***
(0.3953)
0.6227 ***
(0.1056)
-0.0715
(0.0625)
0.0041 ***
(0.0005)

-1.5997 ***
(0.5478)
0.3428 ***
(0.1173)
-0.0945
(0.0647)
-0.001
(0.0020)

-0.0846 ***
(0.0108)
0.2665 ***
(0.0273)
-0.0522 ***
(0.0050)
0.0001 ***
0.0000

-0.0168
(0.0209)
0.1918
(0.1723)
0.0324
(0.0697)

0.0299
0.0467
(0.2579)
(0.2587)
0.4476
0.2558
(0.3269)
(0.3696)
4.857 ***
4.8246 ***
(0.5846)
(0.5888)

0.0425 ***
(0.0031)
-0.1791 ***
(0.0185)
0.1696 ***
(0.0220)
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Table 10: Continued
Variables
Other population and
plan characteristics
Risk score

2006 Sample

2008 Sample

1.2604 ***
0.2877 **
(0.1222)
(0.1331)
Medicare Population (in millions)
-0.045 ***
-0.0195 ***
(0.0047)
(0.0050)
LIS_0prem
-0.2275 ***
-0.0576 ***
(0.0131)
(0.0161)
Deductible
-0.0013 ***
-0.0004 ***
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
Gap coverage (Generics only)
0.1185 ***
0.613 ***
(0.0180)
(0.0133)
Gap coverage (All Drugs)
1.2687 ***
0.0147
(0.0356)
(0.2531)
(N=1,414)
(N=1,822)
R-Square
0.8772
0.8551
Percent due to characteristics change
Percent due to coefficients change

Difference

Full Sample

-0.9727 ***
(0.1807)
0.0255 ***
(0.0069)
0.1699 ***
(0.0207)
0.0009 ***
(0.0001)
0.4945 ***
(0.0224)
-1.254 ***
(0.2556)

0.7065 ***
(0.1270)
-0.0322 ***
(0.0048)
-0.1594 ***
(0.0122)
-0.0011 ***
(0.0001)
0.4333 ***
(0.0120)
0.6226 ***
(0.0452)
(N=3,236)
0.732
99%
1%

*** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level

As shown in Table 10, three regression results using different samples are
presented. The results for premiums are consistent with the bid results. Cost sharing is
associated with lower premiums, while the number of covered brand name medications
and gap coverage are associated with higher premiums. The estimates of other plan and
population variables are consistent with the bid results too. For example, coverage of a
greater number of generic medications is associated with lower premiums. Medicare
beneficiaries in regions with higher risk scores had higher premiums, while Medicare
93

beneficiaries in regions with a greater number of Medicare enrollees had lower
premiums.
The marginal effect of cost sharing (in tiers 1, 2, and 3) and the regional
characteristics declined between 2006 and 2008. On the other hand, the marginal effect
of the quantity of covered medications (in tiers 1 and 2) and the availability of gap
coverage increased. The utilization controls became more important in determining the
plan premiums in 2008 than in 2006.
Despite changes in a number of coefficients, the effects largely offset.
Surprisingly, nearly all of the premium difference was due to changes in plan
characteristics between the two years while only 1% of the difference is due to changes in
the marginal price of the plan characteristics.
In conclusion, changes in the average bids and premiums are primarily due to
changes in plan characteristics between year 2006 and year 2008. 72% of the change in
bid and 99% of the change in premium can be attributed to changes in plan
characteristics. Different actuarial pricing methods are not found to be the key factor in
explaining the bid and premium difference between 2006 and 2008.

4.3 Premium Elasticities
As introduced in section 1.2.1, CMS auto-enrolls or facilitate-enrolls for Medicare
beneficiaries who are eligible for LIS. The LIS beneficiaries pay no or little premium
and cost sharing; therefore, plan premiums will not be related to their demand for
prescription drug coverage. They must be excluded from the analysis of enrollment with
respect to premium (Frakt and Pizer, 2009). Although LIS beneficiaries can choose to
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enroll in any plans, the vast majority of them remain in the plans to which they were
auto-assigned (Neuman et al., 2007). Given this fact and the fact that Medicare non-LIS
beneficiaries are not allowed to enroll in the benchmark plans, we excluded the
benchmark plans from our analysis. Specifically, a subset of 2008 PDP data containing
only non-benchmark plans is used to measure the price sensitivity of Medicare
beneficiaries.
Following the descriptive statistics in Subsection 4.3.1, Subsection 4.3.2 presents
the OLS and 2SLS regression results together with the estimated premium elasticity and
semi-elasticity.

4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 11 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample data comprising 1,296
non-benchmark PDPs in the United Stated for year 2008. As indicated in Table 11, the
data indicate reasonable variation across most of the variables. For example, the
minimum tier 1 copayment is $0 in contrast to the maximum of $18. Some plans choose
to cover over 2,000 medications on tier 1 while some other plans covered only a few
hundred on tier 1. Also indicated in Table 11, the minimum PDP premium is $12.90 per
month while the highest is over $100. The average PDP premium of $45.72 is $20 higher
than the premium for MAPDs. The differential partly reflects the fact that the majority of
PDP enrollees are Medicare fee-for-service members, who are generally less healthy than
MAPD enrollees. For market share, the mean is 0.48% with a maximum of 10.7%. This
indicates that the PDP market was dominated by a few large insurance companies in
2008.
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Table 11 Descriptive Statistics, 2008 Non-benchmark Plans
(n=1,296)

Variables
PDP premium
Premium - avg. MAPD premium
Market ahare

Mean Std. Dev
Max
Min
45.72
20.48
107.5
12.9
20.15
21.49
85.79 -28.58
0.48%
1.20% 10.70% 0.00%

Cost sharing
Tier 1 copayment
Tier 2 copayment
Tier 3 coinsurance
Tier 4 coinsurance

5.28
30.29
68%
30%

3.16
7.1
21%
8%

18
45
100%
100%

0
15
25%
8%

# of drugs on each tier
# of drugs on tier 1
# of drugs on tier 2
# of drugs on tier 3
# of drugs on tier 4

1,885
933
897
357

271
352
782
288

2,282
3,360
3,007
1,359

599
468
0
0

565
471
84

365
233
114

1,860
2,961
424

4
71
0

Other plan characteristics
Deductible
Gap coverage

56.29
0.4

104.12
0.49

275
1

0
0

Market characteristics
Risk score
Number of Competing PDPs

0.99
53.84

0.04
3.08

1.05
63

0.91
47

Instrument variables
Mean premium
Max premium
Min premium
Number of PDPs
Number of MAPDs

41.63
69.9
19.94
51
56

12.46
22.88
10.77
1
4

82.86
107
63
56
105

19.9
0
9.8
50
25

Utilization controls
Quantity limits
Prior authorization
Step therapy
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We also introduced a new variable of market characteristics, the number of
competing PDPs, and 5 instrument variables for the endogenous premium, including the
mean, maximum, and minimum premiums, the number of PDPs and the number of
MAPD plans in other service regions. The number of competing PDPs varies moderately
from 47 to 63. The mean, maximum and minimum premiums in other service regions
show considerable variation in the range of $53 to $107. The number of PDPs in other
service regions is relatively stable ranging from 50 to 56. Conversely the number of
MAPD plans in other service regions starts as low as 25 while ends as high as 105.
Compared to the full sample of 2008 in Table 8, the non-benchmark plans have
slightly higher member cost-sharing except for tier 4. In addition, these non-benchmark
plans cover approximately the same amount of medications on each tier and utilization
controls as the full sample. No significant difference was found for other plan and
market characteristics variables between the two samples.

4.3.2 OLS and 2SLS Model Results
Equation (3.9) using the composite outside good was estimated by OLS and 2SLS
with the firm fixed effects model. The regression results, elasticities (e) and semielasticities (k) are presented in Table 12. The OLS-estimated elasticity and semielasticity are -0.5 and -0.01, respectively. However, given that plan premiums are
endogenous, OLS estimates are biased. Consistent estimates are obtained via 2SLS. The
2SLS-estimated elasticity and semi-elasticity are -1.80 and -0.04 are over three times the
magnitude of the OLS-estimated elasticities. Frakt and Pizer (2009) also found that the
2SLS-estimated elasticities were greater in magnitude than the OLS ones.
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Table 12 Regression Results Assuming Composite Outside Goods

Variables
PDP Premium
Intercept
Cost Sharing
Tier 1 Copayment
Tier 2 Copayment
Tier 3 Coinsurance
Tier 4 Coinsurance
# of Drugs on Each Tier
Ln (# of Drugs on Tier 1)
Ln (# of Drugs on Tier 2)
# of Drugs on Tier 3
# of Drugs on Tier 4
Utilization Controls
Quantity Limits
Prior Authorization
Step Therapy
Other Plan Characteristics
Annual Deductible
Gap Coverage
Market Characteristics
Risk Score
Number of Competing PDPs
Instrument Variables
Mean Premium
Max Premium
Min Premium
Number of PDPs
Number of MAPDs

Two-Stage Least Square
OLS
First Stage Coefficient Second Stage Coefficient
Estimates Standard Error Estimates Standard Error Estimates Standard Error
-0.04 (0.0047) ***
-0.011 (0.0032) ***
-346.849 (44.5126) ***
1.848 (3.2797)
9.811 (2.9980) ***
-0.482
0.446
-4.695
9.805

(0.0976)
(0.0567)
(1.9313)
(4.3833)

***
***
**
**

-0.011
0.013
-0.238
1.64

(0.0135)
(0.0076) *
(0.2564)
(0.6362) **

-0.025
0.007
0.378
1.148

(0.0140) *
(0.0080)
(0.2516)
(0.4746) **

8.617
-3.613
-0.001
0.003

(2.4408) ***
(0.9110) ***
(0.0006)
(0.0012) **

0.924
-1.327
0.001
0.001

(0.3689)
(0.1382)
(0.0001)
(0.0002)

**
***
***
***

0.061
-1.387
0.001
0.001

(0.3432)
(0.1354) ***
(0.0001) ***
(0.0001) ***

0.005
0
-0.002

(0.0011) ***
(0.0017)
(0.0035)

0.001
-0.002
-0.004

(0.0001) ***
(0.0002) ***
(0.0005) ***

0.001
-0.002
-0.005

(0.0001) ***
(0.0002) ***
(0.0005) ***

-0.024
27.712

(0.0034) ***
(0.5924) ***

-0.007
-0.718

(0.0005) ***
(0.1316) ***

-0.006
-1.169

(0.0005) ***
(0.1321) ***

-1.693
-0.054

(7.0763)
(0.0923)

-2.7
-0.056

(1.0461) **
(0.0129) ***

-3.225
-0.073

(1.0745) ***
(0.0133) ***

0.345
0.138
0.467
5.949
-0.069
R-square =

(0.1698) **
(0.0476) ***
(0.1425) ***
(0.7579) ***
(0.0667)
0.84
R-Square =
e=
k=

0.54
-1.804
-0.04

R-Square =
e=
k=

*** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level
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0.48
-0.496
-0.011

These estimates are greater in magnitude than Frakt and Pizer (2009) found for
2007 (e = -1.45 and k = -0.039). As expected, with the implementation of experience
rating, the estimated elasticity and semi-elasticity for 2008 are greater in magnitude than
the estimated elasticity in 2007. The results may also suggest that with another year of
knowledge on the PDP products, Medicare beneficiaries are more informed to choose the
plans that best fit their needs and thus are more sensitive to plan premiums.
Although the welfare study of Medicare HMOs by Town and Liu (2003) does not
include the Part D market, it is worth comparing our elasticity estimated with theirs.
They estimated a premium elasticity of demand of -0.33 in the Medicare HMOs between
1993 and 2000, which is significantly lower than our 2SLS estimates.
Frakt and Pizer (2009) gave explanation for the higher PDP premium elasticity.
The PDP market has a large number of entrants due to the low fixed costs of entry. PDPs
do not have to establish provider networks as Medicare HMOs or employer sponsored
plans do. Medicare beneficiaries have a large number of PDPs available to choose from
and hence are more sensitive to price change.
Equation (3.9) is also estimated by defining MAPDs as the outside good. Both
OLS and 2SLS estimates, together with the premium elasticity and semi-elasticity, are
presented in Table 13. It is important to point out that the plan premium in Equation
(3.9) now becomes the difference between the PDP premium and the average MAPD
premium in each PDP region. The market share of the outside good, MS0, is the market
share of aggregate MAPDs in each PDP region.
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Table 13 Regression Results Assuming MAPDs as Outside Goods

Variables
PDP Premium MAPD Premium
Intercept
Cost Sharing
Tier 1 Copayment
Tier 2 Copayment
Tier 3 Coinsurance
Tier 4 Coinsurance
# of Drugs on Each Tier
Ln (# of Drugs on Tier 1)
Ln (# of Drugs on Tier 2)
# of Drugs on Tier 3
# of Drugs on Tier 4
Utilization Controls
Quantity Limits
Prior Authorization
Step Therapy
Other Plan Characteristics
Annual Deductible
Gap Coverage
Market Characteristics
Risk Score
Number of Competing PDPs
Instrument Variables
Mean Premium
Max Premium
Min Premium
Number of PDPs
Number of MAPDs

Two-Stage Least Square
OLS
First Stage Coefficients Second Stage Coefficients
Estimates Standard Error Estimates Standard Error Estimates Standard Error
-389.525 (57.0340) ***

-0.039 (0.0052) ***
6.39 (3.6245) *

-0.002 (0.0031)
16.791 (3.2397) ***

-0.443
0.412
-5.618
16.814

(0.1251)
(0.0727)
(2.4745)
(5.6163)

***
***
**
***

-0.016
0.012
-0.336
1.909

(0.0149)
(0.0084)
(0.2833)
(0.7031) ***

-0.034
0
0.435
1.252

(0.0152) **
(0.0086)
(0.2722)
(0.5172) **

8.198
-3.854
-0.001
0.004

(3.1273) ***
(1.1673) ***
(0.0008)
(0.0016) ***

0.976
-1.334
0.001
0.001

(0.4077)
(0.1527)
(0.0001)
(0.0002)

**
***
***
***

-0.235
-1.396
0.001
0.001

(0.3683)
(0.1477) ***
(0.0001) ***
(0.0002) ***

0.005
0
-0.004

(0.0014) ***
(0.0021)
(0.0045)

0.001
-0.002
-0.004

(0.0001) ***
(0.0003) ***
(0.0006) ***

0.001
-0.002
-0.005

(0.0001) ***
(0.0002) ***
(0.0005) ***

-0.021
27.597

(0.0044) ***
(0.7591) ***

-0.008
-0.734

(0.0005) ***
(0.1454) ***

-0.007
-1.429

(0.0005) ***
(0.1345) ***

-36.208
0.224

(9.0668) ***
(0.1182) *

-1.904
-0.136

(1.1560) *
(0.0143) ***

-2.606
-0.151

(1.1721) **
(0.0145) ***

0.488
0.13
0.307
6.775
-0.136
R-square =

(0.2176)
(0.0610)
(0.1826)
(0.9711)
(0.0855)
0.75

**
**
*
***

R-Square =
e=
k=

0.51
-0.778
-0.039

R-Square =
e=
k=

*** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level
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0.46
-0.043
-0.002

In Table 13, the OLS-estimated elasticity (e = -0.04) and semi-elasticity (k = 0.002) are much lower than those for the composite outside good in Table 12. The 2SLSestimated elasticity (e = -0.78) is less than half of that in Table 12 while the semielasticity (k = -0.04) is similar to that in Table 12.
The estimated price elasticity is much smaller when explicitly including an
outside good. The reason for this is straightforward. Given the average PDP premium of
$45, a ten percent price increase would be a $4.50 premium increase. However, when
following Town and Liu (2003) and defining the price as the difference between the
premium and the premium of the outside good, ceteris paribus, that 10% increase in
premium results in a 22% increase in the premium difference (the $4.50 increase in the
$20 average difference). Thus, consumers appear much more price sensitive when the
outside good is not explicitly included in the analysis. Including the MAPD product as
the outside good indicates that consumers are less sensitive to price. The fact that both
methods found a similar semi-elasticity in Table 12 and Table 13 is consistent with this
argument.
In Table 12 and Table 13, the relationships between most variables and market
share are as expected. Among plan characteristics, higher premiums and annual
deductibles are associated with lower market share. Inclusion of more drugs on
formulary tiers tends to encourage enrollment except for Tier 2 brand name medications.
Enrollees are responsive to the number of generic drugs (tier 1 drugs). This is not
surprising given the fact that the generic drugs comprise over 60% of overall drug
utilization. Thus, consumers are sensitive to access to medications. Among the
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utilization controls, prior authorization and step therapy tend to lower enrollment while
quantity limits do not.
Market characteristics also affect enrollment significantly. Intuitively, the greater
the number of competing plans, the lower the enrollment in each plan. As more plans
enter the PDP market, each can only get a small slice of the market given a fixed number
of Medicare beneficiaries.
Not all results are as expected. First, tier 1 copayment and tier 3 coinsurance have
negative signs while rates of cost sharing in tiers 2 and tier 4 have positive signs.
However, only tier 4 coinsurance is statistically significant. This finding along with the
positive relationship between the number of covered medications and market share
suggests that individuals are more concerned with coverage of medications than the level
of copayment. In addition, whether medications are covered, and the overall premium
and deductible are relatively transparent to consumers when deciding which plan to
purchase. The implications are levels of copayments across tiers may be less clear to
consumers. Second, controlling for the number of PDPs in the region, plans tend to have
a smaller market share in regions with sicker Medicare beneficiaries. It was expected
that enrollees with poorer health would derive greater utility from prescription drug
coverage.
Another counterintuitive observation is the sign associated with gap coverage.
Gap coverage is expected to attract individuals to enroll. However, in Table 12 and
Table 13, offering gap coverage was associated with lower market share. The results in
Section 4.1.3 showed that covering generic drugs in the gap increases the plan bid by
approximately 19% and covering brand names drugs increases the plan bid by an
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additional 20%. Since gap coverage is a supplemental benefit, the cost of providing gap
coverage is completely passed on to Medicare beneficiaries. In other words, plans
offering gap coverage charge significantly higher premiums than plans that do not
because the premium will cover the expected cost of providing the benefit plus
administrative costs. While gap coverage is quite useful for individuals that are high
users of medications, most individuals do not have sufficient drug spending to reach the
donut hole. Thus, such consumers may not be willing to pay extra out-of-pocket cost to
get gap coverage that may not be necessary to them.

4.4. Summary
Given the relative short history of the Medicare Part D program, not much
research has been done to examine the Part D plans. Serving as one of the pioneer
studies, this dissertation has taken a three-step approach to test four hypotheses in the
Medicare PDP market.
First, using Hedonic pricing models with firm fixed effects, we found evidence to
support Hypothesis 1 that the tiered copayments are consistent with their actuarial values.
Our results show that higher copayment on each tier is associated with lower plan bid.
However, no evidence was found for Hypothesis 2 that utilization control tools lower
plan bids.
Second, adopting the decomposition method by Neumark (1988), we decomposed
the difference in bid and premium between 2006 and 2008 into two parts: changes in plan
characteristics and changes in marginal price. We found that the difference was primarily
caused by the difference in plan characteristics. As a result, Hypothesis 3 that actuarial
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pricing methods play an important role in explaining the premium and bid difference
between 2006 and 2008 was rejected.
Finally, we estimated the premium elasticity and semi-elasticity of demand using
a mean utility logit model. The estimated elasticity of -1.804 and semi-elasticity of -0.04
supports Hypothesis 4, that Medicare beneficiaries are sensitive to PDP premiums.
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Chapter Five
Discussion

5.1 Conclusions
The Medicare Part D program represents the largest expansion of the Medicare
program in Medicare history. While the MMA provided a basic benefit structure by law,
most firms have chosen to provide alternative benefit structures that included the use of
tiered cost sharing. The firms are also given the flexibility to establish formularies and
apply utilization control tools to covered drugs, such as prior authorization, quantity
limits, and step therapy. The plan design is subject to the approval of CMS, the agency
that administers the Medicare program.
This dissertation is one of the pioneer studies in the field that measure the PDPs in
the context of the highly regulated Medicare Part D market. Specifically, this dissertation
tested four hypotheses related to PDPs from different perspectives, including benefit
structure, pricing method and sensitivity of enrollees to premium, using 2006-2008
Prescription Drug Plan (PDP) data.
We found that the tiered copayments are consistent with their actuarial values.
The results of the firm fixed effects model show that plan bid is inversely related to
enrollee’s cost sharing. However, despite being statistically significant, the marginal
effects are quite small. The effects were larger for preferred brand name medications
than generic medications, suggesting that insurers expect an increase in tier 2 cost sharing
to induce a small shift toward generic drugs. However, we did not find evidence on tier
shifting from non-preferred brand name drugs and specialty drugs to preferred name
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drugs. The effect of cost sharing on consumer demand for medications and plan bids has
important policy implications. One of the primary goals of prescription drug coverage
was to increase access to medications for the elderly. Reductions in consumer demand
due to high cost sharing would need to be monitored to ensure this goal is not
compromised. In addition, the Part D plan price elasticities can be informative to CMS in
monitoring plans and consumer behavior.
Among the utilization control tools, we found that only prior authorization lowers
plan bid. Although counterintuitive, step therapy and quantity limits were found to
increase plan bid. These utilization control tools are designed to lower the expected
claim cost which is positively related to plan bid. But we did not find consistent evidence
to support the hypothesis that these tools lower plan bid. However, this does not
necessarily imply that these utilization control tools fail to function as they were designed
to. The insurers may have failed to reflect the potential savings in the plan bids.
Considerable changes in average plan characteristics had occurred between 2006
and 2008. Many plans have been adjusted to cover fewer medications and encourage
beneficiaries to use generic medications over brand name medications. In addition, the
bids in 2006 were based on manual rates due to the lack of experience. Starting in 2008,
experience-based bid has been required by CMS as plans accumulate Part D experience.
This would lead to considerable changes in the marginal prices associated with plan
characteristics.
Overall, changes in average bids and premiums were primarily due to changes in
plan characteristics. Nearly three quarters of the change in bid and virtually all of the
change in premium was attributed to plan characteristics. Thus, the move to increasing
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cost sharing for brand name medications and covering fewer medications has led to a
reduction in plan bid.
A number of additional results are worthy of discussion. The average bid
declined in 2008 compared to 2006 while the average beneficiary premium increased.
This is likely due to the weighting method used by CMS to arrive at the national average
bid. As discussed earlier, all bids were weighted equally in 2006 due to the lack of
enrollment history. By 2008, the national average bid was a blended average of the
unweighted average bid and an enrollment weighted average bid. The beneficiary
premium is a percentage of the national average bid, suggesting that in 2008 weighted
average bid was greater than the unweighted average. This led to an increase in the
national average bid used to calculate the beneficiary premium.
Many of the changes in plan characteristics likely reflect the lack of knowledge
insurers had in serving this market. Given this lack of experience, many plans covered
all the drugs on CMS formulary file although they were not required to in 2006. After
gaining two years’ experience in the Medicare Part D market, in 2008, plans are more
sophisticated in benefit design and formulary controls. Similarly, in 2006 the plan bid is
positively related to the PDP region Part D risk scores and negatively related to the
Medicare population in the region. However, the importance of the regional variables
declined by 2008. As insurers gained more knowledge and began to use experience
rating, regional characteristics become less important.
One interesting aspect of the part D program is the generous benefits offered to
low-income beneficiaries. Individuals meeting certain income requirements have their
premiums and deductibles covered by the federal government. In addition, cost sharing
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is quite limited. CMS randomly auto-assigns the new dual eligible enrollees to the PDPs
that are below the regional low income subsidy benchmark. In order to get the autoassigned members, these plans generally bid lower than the plans that do not intend to
enroll low income members.
Enrollment is very important in measuring the success of implementing the
Medicare Part D program. Another goal of the program was to encourage competition
between plans in order to maximize consumer benefits and minimize costs. However, in
order to achieve this goal, enrollees must be responsive to price differences between
plans. Consequently, enrollee price sensitivity to plan premiums is of great interest to
many researchers and policy makers. We estimated the elasticity of Medicare PDP
enrollment with respect to plan premium (-1.80 using a composite outside good and -0.78
using MAPDs as the outside good). Such estimates are higher in magnitude than prior
research on enrollee price sensitivity in the Medicare HMO market. According to Frakt
and Pizer (2009), the higher PDP premium elasticity is consistent with the nature of the
PDP market. Due to the lower fixed cost of entry, PDPs can easily enter the Medicare
Part D market. In each PDP region, Medicare beneficiaries generally have over 50 PDPs
to choose from. These PDPs are more similar than plans than those of the Medicare
HMO market. In addition, PDPs do not require restrictive provider networks that
Medicare HMOs have. Therefore, PDP enrollees are more sensitive to premiums than
Medicare HMO enrollees.
The estimated premium elasticity using a composite outside good is larger in
magnitude than Frakt and Pizer’s estimates (-1.804 vs. -1.475). The increased sensitivity
to price was expected with the change to experience rating. Experience rating was
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expected to result in greater premium variation among similar plans (Cutler, 1994), and
thus results in consumers being more price sensitive. The results may also indicate that
with one more year experience in the Part D market, PDP enrollees are more
knowledgeable about the PDP products. As such, they are more responsive to the PDP
premiums. Plan premium is an important factor in determining the plan’s market share.
This study also expanded on Frakt and Pizer’s (2009) paper by including MAPD
premiums and enrollment as an outside good. The estimated price elasticity is much
smaller when explicitly including an outside good. Thus, consumers appear more price
sensitive when the outside good is not explicitly included in the analysis. Including the
MAPD products as an outside good resulted in consumers appearing much less sensitive
to price. However, the semi-elasticity which is measures the consumer’s response to a $1
change in premiums indicates little difference between the two methods.
Insurance companies aimed to attract Medicare beneficiaries to enroll by offering
tiered copayments instead of fixed member cost-sharing. However, our results showed
that lower copayments do not necessarily affect market share. Gap coverage was
associated with lower market share. The relationship may reflect the higher premiums
associated with gap coverage and the fact that most enrollees do not use sufficient
medications to reach the gap. Consumers may not be willing to pay a known higher price
for benefits that are unlikely to be used.

5.2 Limitations
Although a systematic method has been employed to explore the relationship
between plan bids and plan characteristics, and premium elasticities, this dissertation
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does have some limitations. First, the results need to be interpreted carefully. The results
cannot be applied to the MAPD plans as the enrollees in the MAPD plans may have
different utilization patterns than the PDP enrollees. A majority of the PDP enrollees are
Medicare FFS members who are usually less healthy than the MAPD enrollees.
Another possible concern is that the use of a fixed effect model specification may
not be appropriate. If insurers do not vary their cost sharing structure across plans or
geographic regions, then the fixed effects specification will not be able to accurately
estimate the relationship between cost sharing and bids, and a specification without firm
fixed effects may be more appropriate. For this purpose, we estimated an OLS model
without the firm fixed effects to determine whether the results differ or not. The results
are qualitatively similar, although the effects for tier 1 and tier 2 cost sharing are even
weaker without the firm fixed effects. Thus, it does not appear that the use of a firm
fixed effects specification leads to the small measured relationship between cost sharing
and plan bids.
No evidence was found on the differential effects of low risk and high risk
regions. This result is consistent with a number of previous studies that have not found
medications for chronic conditions to be more sensitive to cost sharing. However, it is
important to note that this dissertation used a market level variable to measure health
status within the region. Firms may attract different risks across regions, and the market
level variable may not be strongly correlated with a firm’s experience.
Given the limitation imposed by the data used, we could not examine specific
drugs. While CMS set the minimum standards for the formulary files, they also give the
firm latitude to modify their formulary, subject to review and approval. As a result, some
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plans may cover some brand drugs on tier 2, some plans may cover the same drugs on the
tier 3 while others may not cover them at all. The impact of specific drugs to the bids and
the effect of adding the same drug on different tiers are not provided in this dissertation.
Further, we used the median negotiated prices for generic drugs and brand name drugs to
convert the tier 1 and tier 2 coinsurance into copayments, and convert tier 3 and tier 4
copayments into coinsurance. However, the median drug cost of each tier may differ by
plan due to the different number and type of drugs covered. The coefficient estimates
associated with the tier cost sharing variables in the firm fixed effects model cannot be
used to predict individual plan’s behavior.
More importantly, since the Medicare Part D program started in 2006, both the
2006 and the 2007 bids were developed using manual rates. Although the 2008 bids were
supposed to be experience based, some plans continued to use manual rates in lack of
creditable experience. Some of these early age bids used in this dissertation may not be
mature enough to accurately capture actual utilization patterns and claim costs associated
with each plan. In other words, these projected plan costs may differ from the actual
costs. The significant risk corridor reconciliation amounts in Appendix B (Figure B5 and
Figure B6) in the end of years 2006 and 2007 support this point of view. As more claims
experience becomes available and the plans have more creditable experience in the
Medicare Part D market, the plan bids in the future will be fully experience based, which
may have different copayments elasticities than the plan bids documented in this
dissertation.
Similarly, these early age bids used in this dissertation have not gained expertise
to effectively use the utilization control tools. The manual rates used in the bids may not
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correctly reflect the potential savings. That may explain the counterintuitive results
produced by the models in this dissertation. We expect the future fully experience based
bids would more accurately capture the savings caused by these utilization control tools.
From the enrollees’ perspective, PDPs are new products that they have little
knowledge about. Given the short history of the Part D program, they may not be
knowledgeable enough to choose the plans that best meet their needs. In other words,
enrollment behavior may occur that would not appear to maximize utility because of
enrollees’ incomplete information. If the lack of information or the ability to use the
information resulted in a large number of seemingly irrational plan enrollments, the
premium elasticity estimated in this study may not be valid. This problem is expected to
be alleviated as the level of information increases with the greater experience gained by
enrollees in the future.
In addition, due to data limitation, we did not consider the government subsidies,
such as low income subsidy and federal reinsurance subsidy. Although the bid amount
reflects the plan’s portion of potential claim liabilities, the government subsidies do
impact enrollees’ overall utilization patterns, especially for the low income enrollees.
Thus, the plan’s liability may be impacted indirectly.
For the same reason, this dissertation did not take into account of the risk corridor
reconciliation payments since the plan level data were not available. The significant risk
corridor payments at the end of years 2006 and 2007 also indicate that not all plan bids
were priced accurately to reflect the actual claim costs incurred by each plan. In other
words, not all plan bids captured the plans’ expected claim costs correctly. Thus, the
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copayment elasticities estimated may not reflect the enrollees’ demand for prescription
drugs.
The final limitation is the missing insurer characteristic data, such as rebates
received from pharmaceutical companies and/or AWP (average wholesale price)
discounts with the PBM, underwriting and administrative costs, etc. Inclusion of these
data, when they are available, would be expected to improve the model accuracy and
reduce the variation.

5.3 Future Research
Since the inception of the Medicare Part D program, criticisms have been
frequently heard, such as, the limited access to medical care service due to the specific
design of “donut hole”, the complicated benefit structure design, the government’s lack
of negotiating power on drugs with pharmaceutical companies, premium hikes, etc.
These criticisms and concerns should be addressed using prescription drug claims data
when they become available in the future.
Other limitations mentioned in the preceding section should also be addressed in
future research. Fortunately, CMS has recently planned to initiate a phased schedule to
release the Medicare Part D experience data (detailed claims data by enrollee) to
researchers. With these experience data being available, most limitations discussed can
be addressed. For example, with information on cost per script, dispensing fees, and plan
paid amount becoming available, the average drug cost can be measured more accurately.
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Moreover, following the work from this dissertation, future research could be
directed to measure the impact of government subsidies using accumulated Part D
experience data.
Risk corridor reconciliation is another interesting topic for future research.
Starting in 2008, the risk corridor threshold band has widened and the risk sharing
percentage has changed as mandated by the MMA (Appendix B Figure B7 and Figure
B8). Eventually the plans will bear more risk. Whether and how the participating firms
will change their pricing strategies is one of the potential research directions in this field.
Currently, a few large insurance companies are dominant in the PDP market.
Benefiting from the economy of scale, they are more likely to charge lower premiums
than the small firms in the future. Our results show that PDP enrollees are very sensitive
to plan premiums. As such, these large insurance companies are likely to further expand
their market share and put the small firms in an even worse situation. Will the Medicare
Part D market eventually become a monopoly or an oligopoly market? Or instead, will
the government play the provider role like Canada? These concerns are also of interest
to us and should be addressed in future research.
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Table A 1 Median Negotiated Prices for Medicare Part D Sample Drugs
All Drugs
Generic Drugs
Brand Name Drugs

$49.82
$18.11
$92.16

Notes: The median price is from Hoadley (2006) who examined prices of the top 150 medications in the
Part D program.
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Table A 2 Average Risk Score by PDP Region

Average Risk Score
PDP
Region
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

States
ME/NH
CT/MA/RI/VT
NY
NJ
DE/DC/MD
PA/WV
VA
NC
SC
GA
FL
AL/TN
MI
OH
IN/KY
WI
IL
MO
AR
MS
LA
TX
OK
KS
IA/MN/MT/NE/ND/SD/WY
NM
CO
AZ
NV
OR/WA
ID/UT
CA
HI
AK

2005
0.9707
1.0141
1.0402
1.0335
1.0132
1.0272
0.9954
1.0120
1.0217
1.0215
1.0503
1.0323
1.0057
1.0228
1.0038
0.9514
0.9699
1.0063
0.9833
1.0004
1.0243
0.9979
0.9842
0.9616
0.9268
0.9374
0.9328
0.9548
0.9583
0.9349
0.9211
1.0026
0.9627
0.9067

2006
0.9707
1.0140
1.0403
1.0335
1.0131
1.0270
0.9950
1.0119
1.0217
1.0212
1.0502
1.0323
1.0055
1.0227
1.0039
0.9512
0.9698
1.0063
0.9833
1.0004
1.0229
0.9978
0.9843
0.9618
0.9268
0.9373
0.9325
0.9548
0.9581
0.9349
0.9212
1.0025
0.9627
0.9070

Notes:
Source file: CMS 2006 Part D risk score by county file - Avg risk Part D.xls.
Weighed by census data - 2005-2007 over age 65 population by county.
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2007
0.9707
1.0138
1.0402
1.0334
1.0130
1.0268
0.9946
1.0119
1.0216
1.0210
1.0501
1.0324
1.0052
1.0225
1.0039
0.9509
0.9697
1.0063
0.9832
1.0004
1.0230
0.9978
0.9843
0.9621
0.9268
0.9372
0.9322
0.9547
0.9580
0.9348
0.9214
1.0025
0.9627
0.9073

Table A 3 Medicare Population by PDP Region

Medicare Eligibles
PDP
Region
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

States
ME/NH
CT/MA/RI/VT
NY
NJ
DE/DC/MD
PA/WV
VA
NC
SC
GA
FL
AL/TN
MI
OH
IN/KY
WI
IL
MO
AR
MS
LA
TX
OK
KS
IA/MN/MT/NE/ND/SD/WY
NM
CO
AZ
NV
OR/WA
ID/UT
CA
HI
AK

2006
239,424
2,002,074
2,858,747
1,261,180
914,799
2,537,956
1,002,150
1,288,827
654,600
1,045,818
3,094,899
1,698,204
1,519,223
1,797,320
1,613,801
844,212
1,734,572
930,083
479,834
465,962
659,249
2,570,082
550,500
408,800
1,933,426
270,105
529,442
797,108
302,537
1,377,990
431,107
4,325,861
186,157
53,218

2007
243,190
2,020,204
2,879,429
1,270,110
928,255
2,556,932
1,023,400
1,318,782
673,878
1,076,986
3,135,438
1,736,672
1,537,840
1,811,669
1,639,637
854,772
1,749,064
942,794
489,388
471,940
642,618
2,641,789
559,862
412,026
1,953,686
277,591
542,294
818,639
308,802
1,409,270
443,820
4,386,037
189,271
55,058

2008
251,595
2,044,099
2,882,739
1,276,946
953,905
2,583,239
1,071,683
1,390,313
714,218
1,144,013
3,189,991
1,796,704
1,569,168
1,827,984
1,680,069
869,604
1,766,839
959,988
504,941
475,855
652,137
2,779,572
574,386
434,408
2,018,057
291,894
574,368
861,625
327,742
1,474,709
473,591
4,466,044
193,033
59,324

Notes:
(1) 2006 and 2007 data are from Kaiser Family Foundation, 2006 Med
Beneficiary.pdf and 2007 Med Beneficiary.pdf.
The state level data are summarized by PDP region.
(2) 2008 data is taken from CMS monthly penetration files (May2008-Sep 2008). The
average members by county are calculated and then summarized by PDP region.
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Table A 4 Company Information by Contract

Contract
Number
S0043*
S0197
S1030
S1516*
S1566
S2321
S2468
S2505
S2770
S2874*
S2893
S3230

Start Date
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2007
1/1/2008
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2007
1/1/2006
1/1/2007
1/1/2006
1/1/2007

Tax Status
For Profit
For Profit
Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit
Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit
For Profit
Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit
Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit
For Profit
Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit
For Profit
For Profit
For Profit

S3389
S3440
S3521
S3994
S4231
S4248
S4496
S4749*

1/1/2006
1/1/2008
1/1/2006
1/1/2007
1/1/2006
1/1/2007
1/1/2007
1/1/2008

For Profit
For Profit
Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit
Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit
For Profit
For Profit
For Profit
For Profit

S4802

1/1/2006

For Profit

S4877*

1/1/2007

Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit

S5540
S5552
S5555*
S5557
S5566
S5569
S5578
S5580

1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006

Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit
For Profit
For Profit
For Profit
For Profit
For Profit
For Profit
For Profit

S5581
S5584
S5585
S5588
S5593
S5596

1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006

For Profit
Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit
Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit
For Profit
For Profit
For Profit
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Parent Company
Aveta, LLC.
Coventry Health Care Inc.
BCBS OF AL & BCBS OF TN
Mennonite General Hospital, Inc
Bravo Health, Inc.
Independence Blue Cross
Blue Shield of California
Windsor Health Group
Independence Blue Cross
Humana Inc.
Wellpoint, Inc.
MEDICAL MUTUAL OF OHIO
University of Pittsburgh Medical
Center
Health Alliance Plan (HAP)
Lifetime Healthcare, Inc.
Hawaii Medical Service Association
Universal Health Care, Inc.
Geisinger Health System
Independence Blue Cross
Preferred Health Inc
Munich American Holding
Corporation
Cooperativa de Seguros de Vida de
Puerto Rico
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of North
Carolina
Humana Inc.
Medical Card System, Inc.
Fox Rx Inc.
Health Care Service Corporation
Coventry Health Care Inc.
HealthSpring
Torchmark Corporation
Universal American Financial
Corporation
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan
HealthNow New York Inc.
Promedica Health System
Highmark Inc.
Wellpoint, Inc.

Table A4 Continued Company Information by Contract

Contract
Number
S5597
S5601
S5609
S5617
S5644
S5650
S5660
S5670
S5674
S5678
S5704
S5715
S5726
S5740
S5741

Start Date
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006

Tax Status
For Profit
For Profit
Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit
For Profit
For Profit
For Profit
For Profit
For Profit
For Profit
For Profit
For Profit
For Profit
For Profit
For Profit
Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit

S5743

1/1/2006

Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit

S5753
S5755
S5766
S5768

1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006

Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit
For Profit
Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit
For Profit

S5775*
S5783
S5795
S5803
S5805
S5810
S5815
S5820
S5822
S5825
S5840*
S5857

1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2007
1/1/2006

For Profit
For Profit
Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit
For Profit
For Profit
For Profit
For Profit
For Profit
For Profit
For Profit
For Profit
For Profit

S5860

1/1/2006

Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit

S5877
S5884
S5902

1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006

Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit
For Profit
For Profit
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Parent Company
Universal American Corp.
CVS Caremark Corporation
The Regence Group
CIGNA
Longs Drug Stores Corporation
AmeriHealth Mercy Health Plan
Medco Health Solutions, Inc.
Coventry Health Care Inc.
Coventry Health Care Inc.
Health Net, Inc.
GlobalHealth Incorporated
Health Care Service Corporation
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kansas
NewQuest Health Solutions LLC
EmblemHealth Inc.
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Minnesota
Wisconsin Physicians Service Ins
Corporation.
Torchmark Corporation
CareFirst, Inc.
Coventry Health Care Inc.
Pharmacy Insurance Corporation of
America
QCC Insurance Company
Arkansas Blue Cross Blue Shield
Universal American Corp.
UnitedHealth Group, Inc.
Aetna Inc.
NewQuest Health Solutions LLC
UnitedHealth Group, Inc.
Bravo Health, Inc.
Universal American Corp.
First Medical Health Plan
Spectrum Health System
Rocky Mountain Health
Maintenance , Inc.
Educators Mutual Insurance
Association
Humana Inc.
Presbyterian Healthcare Services

Table A4 Continued Company Information by Contract

Contract
Number
S5904
S5915
S5916
S5907*
S5917
S5921
S5932
S5937

Start Date
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006

Tax Status
Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit
Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit
Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit
For Profit
For Profit
For Profit
For Profit
Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit

S5946

1/1/2006

For Profit

S5953
S5954
S5960
S5966
S5967
S5975
S5983

1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006
1/1/2006

For Profit
For Profit
For Profit
Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit
For Profit
For Profit
For Profit

S5993
S5998
S6874*
S6875*
S7694
S7950
S8067

1/1/2006
1/1/2007
1/1/2008
1/1/2006
1/1/2007
1/1/2007
1/1/2006

Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit
For Profit
For Profit
Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit
For Profit
For Profit
For Profit

S8201
S8277
S8465
S8475

1/1/2007
1/1/2007
1/1/2008
1/1/2007

For Profit
For Profit
For Profit
For Profit

S8841

1/1/2007

For Profit

S9086

1/1/2006

For Profit

S9176

1/1/2007

Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit

Parent Company
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida
Scott and White
The Regence Group
Blue Shield of Puerto Rico
UnitedHealth Group, Inc.
UnitedHealth Group, Inc.
HealthSpring, Inc.
BlueCross BlueShield of Louisiana
BlueCross BlueShield of South
Carolina (BCBSSC)
BlueCross BlueShield of South
Carolina (BCBSSC)
Dean Health Systems Inc.
Wellpoint, Inc.
EmblemHealth Inc.
WellCare Health Plans, Inc.
The ODS Companies (ODS)
Medco Health Solutions, Inc.
Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of
New Jersey, Inc.
Bravo Health, Inc.
Capital BlueCross
Independence Blue Cross
Envision Insurance Company
Express Scripts, Inc.
Capital BlueCross
University of Pittsburgh Medical
Center
Carolina Care Plan, Inc
Citrus Health Care, Inc.
Quality Health Plans, Inc.
National Medical Health Card Systems,
Inc.
America's Health Choice Medical
Plans, Inc
Capital District Physicians' Health
Plan, Inc.

Notes:
(1) * are the contracts in US territories, which are excluded in this study.
(2) For contracts that changed company names, used 2008 company information.
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Table A 5 Average Plan Bid and Member Premium by Year

Year
2006
2007
2008
Total

Obs.
1,414
1,865
1,822
5,101

Avg. PDP Bid
$101.48
$89.89
$92.63
$94.10

128

Avg. Member Premium
$37.48
$36.81
$40.04
$38.16

Table A 6 Average Plan Bid and Member Premium by PDP Region

PDP Region
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

States
ME/NH
CT/MA/RI/VT
NY
NJ
DE/DC/MD
PA/WV
VA
NC
SC
GA
FL
AL/TN
MI
OH
IN/KY
WI
IL
MO
AR
MS
LA
TX
OK
KS
IA/MN/MT/NE/ND/SD/WY
NM
CO
AZ
NV
OR/WA
ID/UT
CA
HI
AK
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Obs.
147
146
161
158
153
180
146
140
155
148
156
149
149
160
146
156
151
146
153
139
140
163
150
145
146
155
153
147
151
157
154
158
124
119

Avg. Plan
Bid
$94.53
$93.24
$90.38
$93.89
$94.37
$93.49
$94.81
$96.41
$95.40
$94.91
$92.69
$96.05
$94.40
$93.96
$97.21
$94.48
$94.30
$95.11
$94.24
$96.15
$96.14
$93.35
$96.41
$95.39
$94.35
$89.87
$93.57
$90.72
$91.41
$94.35
$97.11
$90.04
$90.92
$96.48

Avg. Member
Premium
$38.58
$37.04
$34.42
$37.94
$38.17
$37.48
$38.84
$40.62
$39.53
$39.06
$36.93
$40.21
$38.57
$38.19
$41.23
$38.43
$38.36
$39.14
$38.48
$40.26
$40.28
$37.29
$40.44
$39.47
$38.38
$33.93
$37.60
$34.62
$35.32
$38.32
$41.08
$33.89
$35.48
$41.12

Table A 7 Average Plan Bid and Member Premium by Contract
Contract
S5617
S5803
S5810
S5921
S5884
S5597
S5601
S5967
S5960
S5644
S5820
S5670
S5678
S4802
S5660
S5755
S5768
S7694
S5674
S5917
S5596
S5932
S5581
S5557
S7950
S8841
S5825
S5715
S5998
S5946
S2505
S0197
S2893
S5552
S5566
S5593
S5726
S5743
S5795
S5877
S3521
S5904
S5954
S2321
S5753
S5783

Number of Plans
306
306
306
306
288
285
272
272
258
210
201
189
182
166
165
163
159
136
108
96
90
69
66
34
34
34
30
27
21
12
10
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
8
8
8
7
7
7

Avg. Plan Bid
$96.14
$94.57
$104.90
$94.65
$94.70
$93.48
$92.91
$88.98
$88.50
$85.70
$86.75
$91.81
$83.28
$105.90
$94.81
$93.69
$84.38
$121.45
$91.10
$101.08
$93.05
$75.56
$116.89
$88.33
$100.93
$84.82
$107.98
$93.47
$77.88
$90.17
$77.94
$90.33
$96.25
$95.48
$91.36
$91.11
$91.55
$113.92
$95.32
$105.91
$89.89
$101.65
$98.83
$103.81
$98.76
$87.82
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Avg. Member Premium
$39.58
$38.02
$48.34
$38.10
$38.37
$37.00
$37.28
$31.93
$31.32
$30.78
$30.08
$35.25
$29.67
$50.91
$39.84
$38.73
$30.76
$68.61
$34.55
$47.25
$36.49
$22.56
$52.89
$34.26
$47.85
$31.74
$46.22
$36.91
$24.97
$33.61
$25.06
$33.77
$39.69
$38.93
$34.80
$34.55
$35.00
$57.36
$38.77
$49.35
$32.83
$46.03
$41.84
$46.19
$42.77
$23.82

Table 7 Continued
Contract
S5805
S5822
S5915
S5993
S8067
S1030
S2468
S5540
S5569
S5584
S5766
S5902
S5953
S3389
S5580
S5588
S5609
S5650
S5741
S5860
S5916
S5975
S5983
S1566
S3230
S4248
S4496
S5704
S8475
S2770
S3440
S5585
S5857
S5937
S5966
S9176
S4231
S8201
S8277
S8465
S3994
S5578
S5740
S5815
S9086

Number of Plans
7
7
7
7
7
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
2
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1

Avg. Plan Bid
$86.52
$80.26
$100.00
$99.26
$88.91
$99.42
$90.86
$115.50
$83.64
$94.32
$98.98
$86.63
$94.68
$89.89
$89.14
$90.07
$104.54
$83.90
$83.79
$101.38
$106.17
$106.11
$94.62
$82.58
$95.29
$78.96
$92.66
$110.05
$85.46
$83.55
$93.26
$86.49
$89.54
$97.65
$79.64
$86.81
$139.44
$85.09
$96.58
$89.94
$82.08
$88.78
$88.78
$89.73
$77.98
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Avg. Member Premium
$28.90
$25.76
$43.94
$43.27
$34.48
$46.58
$34.31
$58.94
$28.99
$37.76
$42.42
$30.08
$38.12
$34.82
$34.08
$35.00
$49.48
$28.83
$28.72
$44.03
$51.11
$51.04
$39.65
$26.89
$42.45
$26.13
$39.83
$51.51
$32.63
$26.99
$40.67
$33.65
$32.99
$41.09
$23.08
$33.73
$75.44
$32.25
$43.50
$37.35
$29.00
$24.78
$24.78
$25.73
$24.90

Table A 8 Regression Results: Firm Fixed Effects Model,

Dependent Variable: Ln (Bid), Plans with Risk Scores < 1.0

Explanatory Variables
Cost sharing
Tier 1 copayment
Tier 2 copayment
Tier 3 coinsurance
Tier 4 coinsurance
# drugs covered
ln(# drugs on tier 1)
ln(# drugs on tier 2)
# drugs on tier 3 (in thousands)
# drugs on tier 4
# drugs subject to:
Quantity limits (in thousands)
Prior authorization (in thousands)
Step therapy (in thousands)
Other plan characteristics
Deductible
Gap coverage for generics
Gap coverage for brands
LIS_0prem
Other Variables
Year 2007
Year 2008
Regional risk score
Regional Medicare population

Estimates

Standard Error

-0.0031***
-0.0025***
-0.0237*
-0.0191

0.0007
0.0004
0.0134
0.0146

-0.0142**
0.0573***
-0.0036*
0.00005***

0.0060
0.0134
0.0022
0.0000

0.0036***
-0.0487***
0.0574***

0.0013
0.0102
0.0120

-0.0004***
0.1791***
0.1763***
-0.0449***

0.0000
0.0053
0.0198
0.0055

-0.1540***
-0.1180***
0.0331
0.0000

0.0079
0.0092
0.0778
0.0028

N
R squared

2,517
0.73

Notes:
(1) *** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level.
(2) The specification also includes a categorical variable for each firm.
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Table A 9 Regression Results: Firm Fixed Effects Model,
Dependent Variable: Ln (Bid), Plans with Risk Scores >= 1.0

Cost sharing
Tier 1 copayment
Tier 2 copayment
Tier 3 coinsurance
Tier 4 coinsurance
# drugs covered
ln(# drugs on tier 1)
ln(# drugs on tier 2)
# drugs on tier 3 (in thousands)
# drugs on tier 4
# drugs subject to:
Quantity limits (in thousands)
Prior authorization (in thousands)
Step therapy (in thousands)
Other plan characteristics
Deductible
Gap coverage for generics
Gap coverage for brands
LIS_0prem ***
Other Variables
Year 2007
Year 2008
Regional risk score
Regional Medicare population

Estimates
-0.0041***
-0.0022***
-0.0240*
-0.0235*

Standard
Error
0.0007
0.0003
0.0128
0.0132

-0.0338***
0.0811***
-0.0056**
0.00005***

0.0058
0.0126
0.0022
0.0000

0.0061***
-0.0292***
0.0356***

0.0014
0.0084
0.0095

-0.0003***
0.1769***
0.1921***
-0.0617***

0.0000
0.0050
0.0184
0.0052

-0.1665***
-0.1311***
-0.2804**
-0.0178***

0.0074
0.0082
0.1341
0.0018

N
R squared

2,584
0.76

Notes:
(1)*** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level.
(2) The specification also includes a categorical variable for each firm.
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Table A 10 Regression Results: OLS, Dependent Variable: Ln (Bid)

Explanatory Variables
Intercept
Cost sharing
Tier 1 copayment
Tier 2 copayment
Tier 3 coinsurance
Tier 4 coinsurance
# drugs covered
ln(# drugs on tier 1)
ln(# drugs on tier 2)
# drugs on tier 3 (in thousands)
# drugs on tier 4
# drugs subject to:
Quantity limits (in thousands)
Prior authorization (in
thousands)
Step therapy (in thousands)
Other plan characteristics
Deductible
Gap coverage for generics
Gap coverage for brands
LIS_0prem
Other Variables
Year 2007
Year 2008
Regional risk score
Regional Medicare population

Estimates
4.2882***

Standard Error
0.0610

-0.0022***
-0.0004*
-0.0676***
-0.0337***

0.0005
0.0002
0.0078
0.0082

0.0123***
0.0274***
-0.0071***
-0.00002***

0.0035
0.0046
0.0015
0.0000

0.0019**

0.0009

-0.0290***
0.0248***

0.0046
0.0074

-0.0001***
0.1954***
0.1811***
-0.1042***

0.0000
0.0041
0.0151
0.0042

-0.1374***
-0.1104***
0.1549***
-0.0116***

0.0058
0.0065
0.0464
0.0018

N
R-square
Adj. R-square

5,101
0.61
0.61

Notes:
*** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table A 11 Regression Results: Firm Fixed Effects Model
Dependent Variable: Ln (Premium)

Explanatory Variables
Cost sharing
Tier 1 copayment
Tier 2 copayment
Tier 3 coinsurance
Tier 4 coinsurance
# drugs covered
ln(# drugs on tier 1)
ln(# drugs on tier 2)
# drugs on tier 3 (in thousands)
# drugs on tier 4
# drugs subject to:
Quantity limits (in thousands)
Prior authorization (in
thousands)
Step therapy (in thousands)
Other plan characteristics
Deductible
Gap coverage for generics
Gap coverage for brands
LIS_0prem ***
Other Variables
Year 2007
Year 2008
Regional risk score
Regional Medicare population
N
R-square

Estimates

Standard Error

-0.0103***
-0.0075***
0.0014
-0.0381

0.0013
0.0006
0.0240
0.0254

-0.0606***
0.2270***
-0.0113***
0.0001***

0.0108
0.0237
0.0040
0.0000

0.0131***

0.0025

-0.0817***
0.0809***

0.0169
0.0194

-0.0009***
0.3903***
0.5182***
-0.1745***

0.0000
0.0095
0.0351
0.0098

-0.0653***
0.0249
0.6553***
-0.0353***

0.0140
0.0159
0.1030
0.0039
5,101
0.69

Notes:
(1) *** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level.
(2) The specification also includes a categorical variable for each firm.
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Table A 12 Regression Results: Firm Fixed Effects Model
Dependent Variable: Square Root (Bid)

Explanatory Variables
Cost sharing
Tier 1 copayment
Tier 2 copayment
Tier 3 coinsurance
Tier 4 coinsurance
# drugs covered
ln(# drugs on tier 1)
ln(# drugs on tier 2)
# drugs on tier 3 (in thousands)
# drugs on tier 4 (in thousands)
# drugs subject to:
Quantity limits (in thousands)
Prior authorization (in thousands)
Step therapy (in thousands)
Other plan characteristics
Deductible
Gap coverage for generics
Gap coverage for brands
LIS_0prem ***
Other Variables
Year 2007
Year 2008
Regional risk score
Regional Medicare population
N
R-square

Estimates

Standard Error

-0.0152***
-0.0113***
-0.1683***
-0.0718

0.0026
0.0012
0.0469
0.0497

-0.1040***
0.2867***
-0.0268***
0.0003***

0.0211
0.0463
0.0079
0.0001

0.0254***
-0.1983***
0.2359***

0.0049
0.0330
0.0379

-0.0017***
0.8904***
1.0138***
-0.2362***

0.0001
0.0185
0.0685
0.0192

-0.7749***
-0.5866***
0.9644***
-0.0560***

0.0274
0.0311
0.2011
0.0077
5,101
0.73

Notes:
(1) *** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level.
(2) The specification also includes a categorical variable for each firm.
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Appendix B: Figures
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Figure B 1 Normal Probability Plot – Ln(Bid)
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Figure B 2 Medicare Population Characteristics

Data Source: Kaiser Family Foundation, “Medicare at a Glance”, November 2008.
The original data is from Income data from US Census Bureau, Current Population Survey published on
statehealthfact.org; all other data from Kaiser Family Foundation analysis of the Medicare Current
Beneficiary Survey 2006 Access to Care file.
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Figure B 3 Data File Layouts

Data Source: CMS Prescription Drug Plan Formulary and Pharmacy Network File layouts.
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Figure B 4 2006-2007 Part D Plan Standard Benefits

Data Source: CMS 2007 Part D Parameter Update 5_30_2006.pdf.
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Figure B 5 2007-2008 Part D Standard Benefits

Data Source: CMS PartDannouncement2008.pdf.
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Figure B 6 2006 Part D Risk Corridor Reconciliation Amount

Note: The totals include all MAPDs and PDPs in 2006.
Data Source: CMS 2006_Part_D_Payment_Recon.pdf.
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Figure B 7 2007 Part D Risk Corridor Reconciliation Amount

Note: The totals include all MAPDs and PDPs in 2007.
Data Source: CMS Part_D_2007_Reconciliation.pdf.

144

Figure B 8 2006-2007 Risk Corridors

Data Source: Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General.
“Medicare Part D Sponsors: Estimated Reconciliation Amounts for 2006.
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Figure B 9 2008-2011 Risk Corridors

Data Source: Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General.
“Medicare Part D Sponsors: Estimated Reconciliation Amounts for 2006.
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